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1. Introduction 
Since 1998, AeroTech Research has contracted with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) to research and develop turbulence detection and avoidance systems.  The contracts were in 
support of NASA’s Aviation Safety and Security Program’s (AvSSP) overall goal to “develop and 
demonstrate technologies that contribute to a reduction in aviation accident and fatality rates.”  From 
1998 to 2003, AeroTech (and other NASA partners) developed the concepts and initial algorithms of 
various safety-related technologies under the NASA Turbulence Prediction and Warning System 
(TPAWS) element of the Weather Accident Prevention (WxAP) Program within AvSSP.  The WxAP 
Program’s three objectives to support the goal of the AvSSP were: 
1. Develop technologies and methods that will provide pilots with sufficiently accurate, timely, and 
intuitive information during the en-route phase of flight, which, if implemented, will enable a 25-
50% reduction in aircraft accidents attributable to lack of weather situational awareness.  
2. Develop communications technologies that will provide a 3- to 5-fold increase in datalink system 
capacity, throughput, and connectivity for disseminating strategic weather information between 
the flight deck and the ground, which, if implemented along with other supporting technologies, 
will enable a 25-50% reduction in aircraft accidents attributable to lack of weather situational 
awareness.  
3. Develop turbulence prediction technologies, hazard metric methods, and mitigation procedures to 
enable a 25-50% reduction in turbulence-related injuries. 
The Turbulence Auto-PIREP System (TAPS) and the Enhanced Turbulence (E-Turb) Radar came to the 
forefront as technologies that were realizable and significant contributors to meeting the TPAWS goal to 
“provide airborne centric technologies for detecting and reporting of hazardous turbulence” that when 
developed would “enable about a 50% reduction in injuries attributable to the lack of turbulence 
situational awareness.”  These two systems were further developed and evaluated both in simulations and 
flight experiments onboard NASA’s B757-200 ARIES Research Aircraft.   
Engineering issues with the NASA B757 aircraft in late 2003 caused the cancellation of the NASA flight 
experiments for the TAPS and E-Turb Radar technologies.  Realizing the importance of the research and 
needing a way to properly evaluate the technologies, NASA and AeroTech sought collaboration within 
the aviation industry.   
In August of 2003, a two-month feasibility study was initiated to develop the content and structure of 
potential In-Service Evaluations (ISE) of the TAPS and E-Turb Radar technologies.  The results of that 
study established separate, two-year ISEs of the technologies with the participation of Delta Air Lines 
(DAL), Rockwell Collins, and Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC), as outlined in Figure 1.  This 
report provides an overview and summary of the efforts, analyses, and results of the ISEs of these 
technologies. 
The objectives of the TAPS and E-Turb Radar ISEs were: 
1) Develop, implement into commercial aircraft and ground station systems, and evaluate algorithms 
that would automatically produce reports of aircraft encounters with turbulence and show the 
reports on ground station displays, and  
2) Implement and integrate E-Turb Radar algorithms into a weather radar onboard a commercial 
aircraft and evaluate the effectiveness of the enhanced radar. 
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• Weather Radar
• Data Logger
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• Ground Station Display  
Figure 1: In-Service Evaluation Collaboration 
2. Turbulence Hazard Metric 
Early in the TPAWS Program, there was an effort to identify a metric to quantify the turbulence hazard to 
a commercial transport aircraft.  The primary requirements were that: 
1. It should unambiguously represent the intensity of the turbulence hazard based on accelerations, 
which result in injuries and damage to an aircraft. 
2. It should not depend on the atmospheric phenomenon that produce the effect on the aircraft 
3. It could be related to measurements or observables made by various forward-looking airborne 
sensors (e.g., radar, lidar, etc.). 
4. It would be measured by sensors onboard an aircraft; thereby, providing a “truth” measurement to 
assess the performance of the sensors. 
5. It could be readily scaled from one aircraft to another based on accepted physics. 
The metric that was decided upon was a running 5-second windowed root mean square (RMS) of the 
vertical acceleration, denoted by σΔn.  The metric was refined in simulations and several sets of flight 
experiments on NASA’s B757-200 research aircraft under TPAWS.  There is plausible justification for 
this choice of metric given the longitudinal response characteristics and operating speeds of transport 
category aircraft.  The selection of five seconds was based on two key considerations: 
• The need to balance between 1) a sample window small enough to adequately resolve small scale 
turbulence that affect aircraft through induced g-loads and 2) an accelerometer measurement 
sample size large enough to calculate an RMS with acceptably low random error; and 
• Five seconds corresponds to the one-kilometer spatial average used by the E-Turb Radar 
turbulence processing, based on typical cruise airspeeds.  Therefore, there was consistency 
between the forward-looking airborne sensor and the in situ accelerometer measurements. 
By using the same hazard metric, TAPS and the E-Turb Radar outputs can be directly compared on a one-
to-one basis as will be seen in Section 5.  The σΔn parameter can also be related to the peak accelerations 
experienced by an aircraft.  Figure 2 shows turbulence encounters from historical flight data; including 
data collected during previous NASA flight tests, National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) 
accident investigations, and several other airline incidents and accidents.  A linear regression applied to 
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this data yields a correlation of 95%.  This data clearly demonstrates that the σΔn parameter can be used as 
a surrogate for peak loads.  
y = 2.595x + 0.004
R2 = 0.948
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Figure 2: Correlation Between Peak Load and Peak σΔn (5 sec. window) 
Analyses were conducted to select thresholds of σΔn that could be used to define the various levels of 
turbulence intensity.  The selection of thresholds was hampered by the lack of clear, objective data 
relating the σΔn parameter to the usual subjective descriptions of light, moderate, and severe turbulence.  
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) states that during 
severe turbulence, items in the cabin become weightless.  Based on this, a threshold of σΔn = 0.3g was 
conservatively chosen as the lower limit of severe turbulence.  These data are consistent with thresholds 
defined in the Forecasting Guide on Turbulence Intensity1.  It is important to note that there is neither a 
need nor ability to be exact in the categorizations of the turbulence intensities.  The need is for thresholds 
that can be used as a basis for warning pilots and dispatchers of potential hazards, as opposed to 
attempting a highly accurate scientific quantification of the effect.  From this threshold analysis and an 
assessment of the σΔn experienced by NASA research pilots during the NASA B757 flight experiments, 
the following threshold scheme was adopted and used for both the TAPS and E-Turb Radar ISEs: 
0.1g ≤ σΔn < 0.2g Light Turbulence 
0.2g ≤ σΔn < 0.3g Moderate Turbulence 
0.3g ≤ σΔn  Severe Turbulence 
3. Turbulence Auto-PIREP System 
TAPS is an autonomous system that generates and provides real-time, objective reports of aircraft 
turbulence encounters in order to improve pilots’, dispatchers’, and air traffic controllers’ situational 
awareness of potential turbulence hazards.  TAPS is a combination of non-flight critical software 
applications residing on an aircraft’s computer system and ground station computers that: 
                                                     
1 “In-flight Aviation Weather Advisories”, NOAA National Weather Service Directive ND229107, May 22, 1991. 
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1) Automate the reporting of all significant encounters with turbulence (regardless of convective, 
clear air, mountain wave classification, or any other source),  
2) Enable the scaling/interpretation of the turbulence reports for dissimilar aircraft, and  
3) Display the turbulence information for use in the cockpit or for use by ground-based personnel.   
The TAPS reporting algorithms consist of three components: hazard metric (σΔn) calculation, reporting 
logic, and report generation.  The hazard metric is continuously calculated during flight.  The reporting 
logic determines when a TAPS report should be generated.  When the value of the hazard metric exceeds 
a particular threshold, a TAPS report is generated containing information on the time, location, aircraft 
flight conditions, and maximum accelerations experienced during the turbulence encounter.  The report 
also contains a parameter that may be used to scale reports to other aircraft to determine the potential 
hazard to that aircraft.  An additional benefit of TAPS is that the system would report any encounters 
when the aircraft exceeded the vertical load acceleration limits, defined by the aircraft maintenance 
manual, that require an airplane structural examination.  A graphical depiction of the overall TAPS 
architecture is shown in Figure 3. 
Communications 
InfrastructureEvent-Driven 
Automatic
Turbulence
Report
Uplink of
Turbulence
Report
Ground Station Network
Cockpit DisplayReporting Algorithms
Turbulence
 
Figure 3: TAPS Architecture 
3.1 TAPS In-Service Evaluation Overview 
The TAPS ISE began in December 2003 with the development of the TAPS reporting software for the 
Delta B737-800 (B738) aircraft.  The installation of the TAPS algorithms on the B737-800 fleet of 71 
aircraft was completed at the end of September 2004.  In FY05, an additional 52 Delta aircraft were 
equipped with TAPS: 31 B767-300ER (B763) and 21 B767-400ER (B764).  Figure 4 shows the history of 
the technology development from initiation of the research through the end of the ISE. 
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Figure 4: TAPS Chronological Development 
3.1.1 Organization 
The TAPS ISE was a collaborative effort, with significant in-kind support, between NASA, AeroTech 
Research, Delta Air Lines, and ARINC.  AeroTech held the prime contract with NASA for the TAPS ISE 
and subcontracted Delta and ARINC to provide resources, expertise, software development, and 
assistance in the analysis and evaluation.  The organizational roles and responsibilities of the various 
participants are outlined in Figure 5. 
NASA
AeroTech
ARINC Delta
• Programmatic oversight
• Funding source
• Participate in evaluation process
• Project management and oversight
• Develop and provide TAPS algorithms for
aircraft and ground station
• Support implementation verification
• Fight data analysis
• Participate in evaluation process
• Handle routing of TAPS reports
• Implement algorithms in ground 
station software
• Maintain TAPS server
• Participate in evaluation process
• Provide aircraft platform and crews
• Implement code on aircraft
• Operational guidance
• Provide flight data
• Participate in evaluation process 
 
Figure 5: TAPS ISE Organizational Structure 
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3.1.2 Aircraft Selection and TAPS Implementation 
During the feasibility study (discussed in Section 1), several Delta departments were approached to 
determine their needs, uses, and information requirements regarding a turbulence encounter.  After 
several iterations, the final form of the TAPS report was realized.  The information included in a TAPS 
report and the individual departments’ user requirements are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: TAPS Report Content and Delta Air Lines User Requirements 
Delta Air Lines Department 
TAPS Report Parameter Units 
Maintenance Flight Safety 
Flight 
Ops Dispatch Meteorology 
Time hh:mm:ss 9 9 9 9 9 
Position, Latitude & Longitude deg  9 9 9 9 
Altitude ft/100 9 9 9 9 9 
Gross Weight klbs 9 9  9  
True Airspeed ft/s 9 9    
Hazard Metric g 9 9 9 9 9 
TAPS Scaling Parameter --   9 9  
Wind Speed kts  9  9 9 
Wind Direction deg  9  9 9 
Peak Vertical Acceleration g 9 9    
Peak Lateral Acceleration g 9 9    
Outside Air Temperature deg C  9  9 9 
Flap Position deg 9     
Flap Handle Position deg 9     
Indicated Airspeed kts 9     
Maintenance Flag -- 9     
Delta Air Lines’ B737-800 fleet was selected for the initial TAPS implementation since it provided a 
large number of similarly equipped aircraft with significant coverage of the continental United States.  
These aircraft were also chosen because of the ease of coding and installation of the TAPS software.  
Delta Tech Ops developed the software code based on AeroTech’s specifications and performed the code 
installation at their facilities.  
Prior to a fleet-wide implementation, the coding and installation of the TAPS algorithms were verified on 
a single aircraft.  This verification and validation process was critical because it ensured that the software 
was working correctly during normal flight operations, the communication of the TAPS reports to the 
ground via the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) was working 
properly, and validated that the TAPS reports broadcast to the ground station contained the correct 
turbulence and aircraft parameter information.  The procedure for implementing the TAPS algorithms on 
the Delta aircraft involved a four-step process: 
1. Development of the code for the TAPS algorithms based on the specifications provided by 
AeroTech. 
2. Installation of the developed code on a single aircraft for a 30-day evaluation. 
3. Verification of the correct implementation using received TAPS reports and flight data. 
4. Implementation of the TAPS software on the remaining fleet aircraft. 
The software was loaded on the Aircraft Condition Monitoring System (ACMS) of the Digital Flight Data 
Acquisition Unit on the aircraft during scheduled maintenance.  Ground testing of each of the reporting 
algorithms components was performed while the evaluation aircraft was in the maintenance hangar.  This 
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testing used data from the aircraft databus to ensure there was total functionality of the software.  There 
was no requirement that maintenance be performed on an aircraft specifically for the purpose of installing 
the TAPS algorithms.  Once satisfactory ground testing was completed, the aircraft was returned to 
service. 
Beginning June 10, 2004, the first TAPS-equipped aircraft was flown in revenue service for a 30-day 
period to check the performance of the installed software.  TAPS reports were generated when the aircraft 
encountered turbulence, transmitted to the ground via ACARS, and logged at ARINC.  By July 10, 2004, 
a total of 31 TAPS reports were generated from 14 separate flights.  Analysis was performed using Flight 
Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data from seven of these flights in which 14 TAPS reports were 
generated.  TAPS reports were ‘generated’ post-flight using the FOQA data and compared to the real-time 
reports.  The comparison checked that the correct number of reports was generated, at the correct time, 
and that the information gathered in the TAPS report was correct.  After the successful verification of the 
TAPS software installation on a single aircraft, fleet-wide implementation began.  The full B737-800 fleet 
implementation was completed by September 21, 2004. 
Following a successful five-month period with TAPS on the B737-800 aircraft fleet, it was requested by 
Delta that a subsequent installation of TAPS on the 52 B767-300ER/400ER aircraft should be performed.  
This additional fleet implementation provided an increased worldwide coverage since these aircraft 
service Hawaii, South America, Europe, and Asia.  The same TAPS implementation procedure used with 
the B737-800 aircraft was followed for the installation of TAPS on the B767 aircraft except that Digital 
Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data was used for the verification of the B767-300ER aircraft, as they are 
not FOQA-equipped.  Further comparative analysis directed towards spot-checking particular aircraft was 
performed during the fleet-wide implementation for additional verification of the functionality of the 
software. 
Figure 6 shows the timeline for the installation of the TAPS software on the Delta aircraft.  The dates 
used in determining the exact installation of the algorithms on a particular aircraft coincide with the date 
of the first TAPS report received by that aircraft.  
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Figure 6: TAPS Installation Timeline 
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3.1.3 Report Handling and Ground Station Display 
The objective of the ground station display effort was to develop a baseline display with functional 
interfaces to assess how dispatchers would utilize real-time, quantitative, objective turbulence encounter 
information in their day-to-day operations.  The communication and routing of TAPS reports utilized 
ARINC’s air-ground communications system as the primary infrastructure for air-ground 
communications, ground data processing, and data display for dispatchers and engineers.  ARINC’s 
communications system consisted of three parts:   
1. GLOBALinkSM air-ground datalink system, 
2. Web Aircraft Situation Display (WebASDSM) application, and 
3. Hosted Messaging System Application.   
GLOBALinkSM is ARINC’s worldwide air-ground datalink network.  This network is a seamless, end-to-
end datalink system that enables aircrews and onboard aircraft systems to communicate and exchange 
information with ground crews and airline host systems anywhere in the world without interruption.  
GLOBALinkSM is the primary technology behind the ACARS used for airline operational control and, 
increasingly, air traffic control communications around the world.  GLOBALinkSM provides clear, 
accurate, unambiguous data communications. 
ARINC’s WebASDSM exhibits the real-time location of aircraft based on FAA and other air traffic control 
system radar position reports.  Worldwide tracking is achievable for aircraft that provide their position via 
datalink.  WebASDSM can display multiple groups of aircraft along with flight data, map overlays, Next-
Generation Radar (NEXRAD) weather overlays, satellite infrared weather imagery, airport weather 
information including terminal area forecasts, aviation routine weather report (METAR), Digital-
Automatic Terminal Information Service, and Terminal Weather Information for Pilots, navigational aids, 
estimated time of arrival, and flight lists that track arrival times and sequence.  WebASDSM can be 
integrated with other automation and decision-support applications and can be used with a wide range of 
computers using a standard Internet browser. 
ARINC’s Hosted Messaging System (OpCenterSM) is designed as a low-cost, user-friendly, easily 
configurable system to enable airlines to exchange datalink messages with their aircraft, with Air Traffic 
Service Provider Organizations, and with their remote operations sites.  OpCenterSM is accessed through a 
web-browser interface.  Messages received through OpCenterSM can be reformatted for input directly to 
existing application systems.  Because it is web-based, the user interface can be tailored to the specific 
needs of individual customers.  This message management tool, in conjunction with WebASDSM, makes 
up a significant part of an airline’s dispatch suite.  OpCenterSM’s purpose within the TAPS program is 
three-fold.  First, it receives and identifies downlinked TAPS reports from the aircraft.  Next, it parses and 
reformats those reports as necessary prior to forwarding them to WebASDSM.  Lastly, OpCenterSM is able 
to receive uplinked turbulence information from WebASDSM and format it for delivery to the ground-air 
network. 
Figure 7 provides an illustration of ARINC’s TAPS Air-Ground Communications System architecture.  
Aircraft downlink TAPS reports to ARINC’s ground network via one of several media (i.e., Very High 
Frequency (VHF), ACARS Over Aviation VHF Link Control (AOA), High Frequency (HF), Iridium, or 
Satellite Communications (SATCOM)).  These reports are then forwarded to the ACARS Central 
Processor, which then routes them to the appropriate ground application.  In the case of TAPS, these 
reports are forwarded to the OpCenterSM Hosted Messaging System, which extracts the TAPS information 
from the downlink, reformats the message, and forwards it to the WebASDSM application.  WebASDSM 
processes this information into a form that can be displayed to the dispatcher and analyzed by 
engineering.  Both dispatchers and engineers can access the WebASDSM application from the Internet or 
through dedicated ground circuits. 
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Figure 7: ARINC TAPS Air-Ground Communications System Architecture 
The TAPS reports were represented on WebASDSM by icons consistent with the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) symbology for turbulence pilot reports (PIREP).  Table 2 shows the levels 
of turbulence intensity reported by TAPS with the corresponding display icon, hazard metric value range, 
and associated AIM guidelines for reporting turbulence.  The reporting logic used by TAPS allows the 
generation of reports at a σΔn value less than the light threshold of 0.1g.  Even though these ‘less than 
light’ reports were not significant for the reporting aircraft, they could prove important to other aircraft 
when scaled accordingly.  There are no corresponding AIM guidelines for this level of turbulence.   
Table 2: Turbulence Reporting Criteria 
Turbulence 
Intensity 
Icon Hazard 
Metric (σΔn) 
Aircraft Reaction Reaction Inside Aircraft 
Less Than 
Light 
 < 0.1g No AIM guidelines. No AIM guidelines. 
Light 
 
0.1g to < 0.2g Turbulence that momentarily causes 
slight, erratic changes in altitude 
and/or attitude. 
Occupants may feel a slight strain 
against seatbelts or shoulder straps.  
Unsecured objects may be displaced 
slightly.  Food service may be 
conducted and little or no difficulty 
is encountered in walking. 
Moderate 
 
0.2g to < 0.3g Turbulence that is similar to light 
turbulence but of greater intensity.  
Changes in altitude and/or attitude 
occur but the aircraft remains in 
positive control at all times.  It 
usually causes variations in 
indicated airspeed. 
Occupants feel definite strains 
against seatbelts or shoulder straps.  
Unsecured objects are dislodged.  
Food service and walking are 
difficult. 
Severe 
 
≥ 0.3g Turbulence that causes large, abrupt 
changes in altitude and/or attitude.  
It usually causes large variations in 
indicated airspeed.  Aircraft may be 
momentarily out of control.  
Occupants are forced violently 
against seatbelts or shoulder straps.  
Unsecured objects are tossed about.  
Food service and walking are 
impossible. 
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Using ARINC’s WebASDSM, Figure 8 and Figure 9 show snapshots of the display showing TAPS reports, 
aircraft, and various weather products and TAPS reports covering a wide geographic area, respectively.  
During the ISE, reports were received from aircraft over India, the Middle East, Europe, the North 
Atlantic, the continental United States, the Eastern Pacific (to Hawaii), Central and South America, and 
the Caribbean. 
From March 2004 to February 2005, fourteen Delta dispatchers were interviewed to gain feedback about 
functional interfaces that would be useful in a TAPS display.  This feedback led to the development of the 
interactive capabilities on WebASDSM that were specific to the TAPS implementation.  The 
functionalities incorporated into the initial release of TAPS on WebASDSM were: 
• Temporal Filtering - users could filter reports based on the age of the report, from real-time to the 
previous twelve hours. 
• Turbulence Intensity Filtering - users could filter reports based on the intensity of the reported 
turbulence. 
• Altitude Filtering - users could filter reports based on a specific altitude range. 
These filtering capabilities allowed the dispatchers to focus on the TAPS reports of interest.  Additional 
functionalities were integrated to identify aircraft that may be affected by available TAPS report 
information, but the ISE ended before these functions could be completely evaluated. 
Delta B737-800Delta B737-800
TAPS ReportsTAPS Reports
Satellite Image OverlaySatellite Image OverlayComposite NEXRADComposite NEXRAD
TAPS Icons
Less than Light
Light
Moderate
Severe
 
Figure 8: TAPS-WebASDSM Display 
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Courtesy of ARINC
 
Figure 9: TAPS-WebASDSM Worldwide Coverage 
3.1.4 Uplink of TAPS Reports to Aircraft 
A major component of the final architecture of TAPS is to provide the TAPS information to pilots.  
Preliminary groundwork to reach this goal was developed during the ISE by demonstrating the ability to 
automatically uplink multiple TAPS reports to specified aircraft via a ground station in real-time.  Since 
the hardware capability to perform a true aircraft-to-aircraft data transfer, such as Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), did not exist on Delta aircraft, all reports had to be routed through the 
ground station network.  The automatic relaying of information (and confirmation thereof) was the focus 
of this part of the ISE.  The turbulence information uplinked to the aircraft was not displayed to the pilot.  
This part of the evaluation was an effort to develop and integrate algorithms, also known as “routing 
rules”, that would automatically determine and transfer TAPS reports to appropriate aircraft as necessary 
and enable the reception and interpretation of the transferred TAPS reports on the receiving aircraft using 
a standard ACARS datalink.  The main components on the receiving aircraft included: 
1. Receiving Algorithm – decoded the uplinked TAPS information for use in the interpretation 
algorithm and return receipt generation. 
2. Interpretation Algorithm – scaled the received TAPS information and determined if the report 
represented a potential hazard to the receiving aircraft. 
3. Return Receipt Packet Generation – combined the TAPS report information and interpretation 
algorithm results to be downlinked for algorithm verification and validation. 
The routing rules included the logic by which the ground station could determine if a TAPS report should 
be routed to another aircraft within the vicinity.  The factors used to make this determination included the 
range of the aircraft from the location where the TAPS report was generated, the intensity level of the 
report, and the capability of any particular aircraft to receive the rerouted TAPS report.  The initial 
implementation was designed to emulate the capabilities of ADS-B, which meant that an equipped 
aircraft had to be within 100 nautical miles of the TAPS report for the uplink message to be sent.  Due to 
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the limitations of the ACMS on the Delta aircraft, only five parameters from the original TAPS report 
could be uplinked at one time.   
Delta Tech Ops personnel developed the software code for the aircraft based on specifications provided 
by AeroTech.  ARINC developed the ground station code, based on the routing rules specified by 
AeroTech, and incorporated it into their communications system.  Beginning in May 2005, the software 
was installed on a total of seven aircraft: 3 B737-800, 2 B767-300ER, 2 B767-400ER. 
3.1.5 Vertical Wind Estimator 
Over the years, there has been significant interest in trying to determine the effectiveness of using 
commercial transport aircraft as atmospheric sensors.  AeroTech has worked with NASA in the past to 
implement a vertical wind estimator on several of its research aircraft.  In 2005, with a successful initial 
implementation of TAPS on the B737-800 already accomplished, NASA decided that, as part of the Delta 
B767-300ER/400ER implementation, a non aircraft-specific vertical wind estimator would be 
incorporated into the software loaded onto the aircraft.  The vertical wind estimation was calculated by:   
( )θφαθα coscossinsincos BBTVVg VIw +−−−=    (3-1) 
where wg = vertical wind component [m/s] 
IVV = inertial vertical speed [m/s] 
  VT = true airspeed [m/s] 
 αB = body angle of attack [rad] 
  θ = pitch angle [rad] 
φ = roll angle [rad] 
The vertical wind estimation was continuously calculated in flight on a total of 52 aircraft.  A 5-second 
moving window RMS of the vertical wind estimation (σw) was also calculated and included in the TAPS 
report generated from B767-300ER/400ER aircraft.  
3.2 TAPS In-Service Evaluation Process 
There were several components to the analyses for the TAPS ISE, namely: 
1. Statistical analyses of TAPS reports: all TAPS reports were accumulated into logfiles, and 
statistical analyses on the reports were performed from the data within the logfiles. 
2. Comparison of TAPS reports to “manual” PIREPs: typically, manual PIREPs are made either 
verbally or via ACARS text messaging.  Either approach incorporates the pilots’ subjective 
assessment of the intensity of the turbulence encounter.  The analyses highlighted the variability 
of the quality of these manual PIREPS relative to the TAPS reports. 
3. The use of TAPS for severe loads maintenance inspections: typically, the captain initiates a 
severe loads maintenance inspection.  For TAPS-equipped aircraft, the number of severe loads 
inspections was tracked and the need for an inspection, based on TAPS reports, was assessed.  
4. Effectiveness of TAPS uplink software: the effectiveness of the uplink algorithms was tracked 
based on reports sent up to aircraft and the automatic acknowledgment sent back from the 
aircraft. 
5. Effectiveness of the vertical wind estimator: the σw estimations reported in the TAPS reports were 
accumulated, and a quantification of the reasonableness of the estimations was determined. 
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6. Feedback from TAPS users: over the period of the ISE, dispatchers, pilots, and other Operations 
Control Center (OCC) personnel were interviewed regarding their use of TAPS, and their 
assessment of the effectiveness of the technology. 
7. Development of a TAPS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for dispatchers: dispatchers from 
several airlines participated in developing the uses and applications of TAPS in their daily tasks. 
Results from each component of the analysis are presented in the next section. 
3.3 Summary of Results 
3.3.1 Statistical Analysis of TAPS Reports 
Every TAPS report generated was collected into a comprehensive database so that the information could 
be analyzed depending on the research needs.  More than 77,000 TAPS reports were broadcast from the 
123 Delta B737-800, B767-300ER, and B767-400ER aircraft from June 2004 to August 2006.  Delta 
discontinued the forwarding of messages to ARINC on August 16, 2006.  Figure 10 shows the location of 
every TAPS report generated during the ISE.  The distribution of TAPS reports by turbulence intensity is 
shown in Figure 11.  Just over 3% of the reports were of moderate or greater intensity.  Figure 12 through 
Figure 14 show the distribution of TAPS reports for each aircraft fleet.   
 
B738
B763
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Figure 10: Geographic Distribution of TAPS Reports 
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Figure 11: Summary of All TAPS Reports Based on Turbulence Intensity 
Period Covered: June 12, 2004 - August 16, 2006
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Figure 12: Summary of B737-800 TAPS Reports Based on Turbulence Intensity 
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Period Covered: April 1, 2005 - August 16, 2006
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Figure 13: Summary of B767-300ER TAPS Reports Based on Turbulence Intensity 
Period Covered: March 21, 2005 - August 16, 2006
Total # of B764 Reports: 4414
16 (0.4%)
188 (4.3%)
3334 (75.5%)
876 (19.8%)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Less than Light Light Moderate Severe
Turbulence Intensity
N
o.
 o
f O
cc
ur
re
nc
es
 
Figure 14: Summary of B767-400ER TAPS Reports Based on Turbulence Intensity 
To understand the communications requirements for an aircraft equipped with TAPS, the number of 
reports per aircraft was tracked on a monthly basis.  Figure 15 through Figure 17 show the number of 
reports generated each month normalized by the number of TAPS-equipped aircraft for each aircraft type.  
The number of TAPS-equipped aircraft is also provided.  On average over all aircraft types, a TAPS-
equipped aircraft generated 32 TAPS reports per month.  Each TAPS report is less that one kilobit (kb); 
this translates to less than 32kb per aircraft per month. 
 
 16 
In 2002, ARINC stated that for its customers, 20 million messages were being sent per month for 6,000 
aircraft2.  This averages to approximately 110 messages per aircraft per day.  A comparison of bandwidth 
requirements was not possible since the size of these messages was unknown but in relation to traffic 
volume, TAPS reporting during the ISE was negligible compared to typical ACARS traffic today. 
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Figure 15: Monthly TAPS Reporting for B737-800 Aircraft 
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Figure 16: Monthly TAPS Reporting for B767-300ER Aircraft 
                                                     
2 Homans, Al, “The Evolving Role of the Communication Service Provider”, Integrated CNS Technologies 
Conference and Workshop, May 1, 2002.  
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Figure 17: Monthly TAPS Reporting for B767-400ER Aircraft 
For the ISE, the TAPS reporting threshold was set at 0.1g, which corresponds to an encounter of at least 
light turbulence.  The reporting threshold may be lowered to provide ride quality information if so desired 
by the industry.  This will not alter TAPS structurally, but will lead to an increase in the overall number 
of reports generated by TAPS-equipped aircraft and therefore, an increase in communications costs.  The 
following example estimates the impact on TAPS reporting if the reporting threshold was lowered to 
0.05g.  This value has no particular technical significance and was used for illustrative purposes only. 
Less than light TAPS reports were generated due to a reporting “deadband” about 0.1g.  Although the 
reports themselves were valid, they do not constitute a full population of the RMS range from 0.05g to 
0.1g and are excluded from this analysis.  The data presented in Figure 11 (excluding the less than light 
reports) were re-sampled into 0.01g “bins” from 0.1g to 0.4g and is shown in Figure 18.  An exponential 
curve fit was applied, and data were extrapolated to the nominal lower threshold of 0.05g.   
Summing the number of reports for each bin from 0.05g to 0.1g, it is estimated that an additional 168,000 
TAPS reports may have been generated, which yields a 387% increase in the total number of reports.  
Using the timeframe of the ISE for which TAPS reports were collected, this averages out to an additional 
53 TAPS reports per aircraft per month.  Combining the extrapolated data with the ISE results, if the 
TAPS reporting threshold had been lowered from 0.1g to 0.05g, a TAPS-equipped aircraft may have 
generated approximately three TAPS reports per day.  This volume of TAPS reporting is negligible when 
compared to the amount of data currently downlinked daily. 
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Figure 18: Curve Fit Applied to Re-Sampled TAPS Report Data 
Additional characterization of the data gathered during the ISE is presented below.  Figure 19 through 
Figure 21 show the number of reports generated by time of day for each aircraft type.  Figure 22 through 
Figure 24 show the number of reports generated by flight level for each aircraft type.  These figures 
represent just a presentation of the data collected during the ISE, and no definitive conclusions could be 
drawn from these results since information about scheduling, traffic volume, etc., was available.  
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Figure 19: Summary of B737-800 TAPS Reports Based on Time of Day 
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Figure 20: Summary of B767-300ER TAPS Reports Based on Time of Day 
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Figure 21: Summary of B767-400ER TAPS Reports Based on Time of Day 
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Figure 22: Summary of B737-800 TAPS Reports Based on Flight Level 
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Figure 23: Summary of B767-300ER TAPS Reports Based on Flight Level 
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Figure 24: Summary of B767-400ER TAPS Reports Based on Flight Level 
3.3.1.1 Spurious TAPS Reports 
During the course of the ISE, unforeseen issues arose regarding the quality of the input data being 
provided to the TAPS algorithms that, in turn, caused the generation of TAPS reports that did not 
represent an encounter with turbulence or severe loads.  These spurious TAPS reports were determined to 
be from one of two separate sources: databus dropouts and incorrect sensor data.  
A method was developed and implemented on the ARINC ground station that would identify these types 
of reports and reject them from being displayed on WebASDSM.  If a report contained data representative 
of a problem with the aircraft’s databus or sensor, the information was provided to airline maintenance 
about the occurrence.  Examples of these issues are provided in more detail below. 
A databus dropout may occur intermittently and was defined by a spike in a particular parameter in the 
flight data.  A dropout could occur in multiple parameters but not consistently in the same parameters.  
Since the vertical acceleration is an important parameter of interest for the TAPS algorithms, analysis was 
focused on instances when there was a dropout in this parameter.  Figure 25 and Figure 26 show 
examples of erroneous data in the vertical acceleration and other parameters.  
Incorrect sensor data also may occur intermittently and ranged from offsets or biases to unreasonable data 
(e.g., UTC time greater than 23:59:59, true airspeed equal to zero, etc.) to problems attributed to sensor 
wiring issues.  Figure 27 shows an example of the vertical acceleration from a B767-300ER aircraft.  
From 1500 seconds to 1900 seconds, the accelerometer appeared to be functioning correctly even though 
the mean acceleration seemed to decrease.  Between approximately 1920 seconds and 2075 seconds, the 
mean acceleration noticeably decreased by 0.02g.  Dropouts in the accelerometer measurements could 
also been seen at 1950 and 2070 seconds.  Following the second dropout, the mean acceleration had 
decreased by almost 0.1g and the signal continued to deteriorate.  Eventually, the signal recovered to 
proper operation but this phenomenon frequently occurred throughout this flight.  A clear explanation of 
the cause of this error was never determined.  The identification of these issues resulted in improved 
awareness of the aircraft system’s performance, since many of these sensor and databus problems would 
possibly have gone unnoticed until the aircraft’s next scheduled maintenance. 
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Figure 25: Databus Dropout in Vertical Acceleration 
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Figure 26: Databus Dropout Examples  
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Figure 27: Example of Erroneous Sensor Data (Vertical Acceleration) 
3.3.2 Comparison of TAPS Reports to Manual Reports  
As part of the TAPS evaluation, Delta pilots of B737-800 aircraft were asked to provide feedback via 
ACARS or e-mail about encounters with turbulence that they deemed as moderate or greater.  This data 
was compiled and compared to any associated TAPS reports from that particular flight.  Feedback from a 
total of 91 events is summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3: Comparison of Reported Turbulence Intensity between PIREPs and TAPS Reports 
No. of 
Events 
% Total 
Events Description 
21 23.1 • PIREP and TAPS reported turbulence intensity agreed. 
35 38.5 • PIREP reported turbulence intensity greater than TAPS intensity. 
11 12.1 • PIREP with no corresponding TAPS report. 
Overestimation 
5 5.5 • PIREP reported turbulence intensity less than TAPS intensity.  
19 20.8 • TAPS report with no corresponding PIREP. 
Underestimation 
From the feedback gathered, a quarter of the events showed a correlation between the turbulence intensity 
reported by the pilots and TAPS.  The remaining events were represented by either an overestimation or 
underestimation of the turbulence intensity.  A majority of the overestimations were when the pilot 
classified the turbulence as “moderate chop” and only a light TAPS report was generated.  For all five 
cases of an underestimation with a PIREP, the PIREP stated either “moderate” or “moderate plus” 
turbulence when a severe TAPS report was generated.  For the other 19 underestimation cases, follow-up 
conversations with the flight crews confirmed the existence of some level of turbulence.  It was difficult 
to correlate the perceived turbulence intensity due to the amount of time between the flight and when the 
interview occurred.  However, it was determined all were in the vicinity of convective activity. 
Examples of the range of traditional PIREP subjectivity are illustrated in Figure 28 and Figure 29.  These 
figures show the processed g-loads data for flights in which TAPS reports were generated along with a 
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traditional PIREP.  The trace represents the level of turbulence that particular aircraft experienced in 
flight. 
Example 1: PIREP Underestimation vs. TAPS Reports 
Figure 28 shows data from a flight in which the pilot reported a moderate turbulence encounter.  This 
PIREP was sent approximately one hour after the actual encounter.  It was also reported that the flight 
crew was investigating a possible passenger injury due to the turbulence.  TAPS reported moderate and 
severe turbulence.  Since the manual PIREP was made an hour after the encounter, it becomes less useful 
in improving the situational awareness of other aircraft in the vicinity.  These aircraft could have possibly 
traversed that same region without ever being aware that a flight ahead of them encountered this level of 
turbulence.   
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Figure 28: PIREPs vs. TAPS Underestimation 
Example 2: PIREP Overestimation vs. TAPS Reports 
Figure 29 shows a reported moderate to severe turbulence encounter.  The pilot made a PIREP 
approximately 5-10 minutes after the encounter.  The pilot also requested that an aircraft inspection be 
performed.  Maintenance personnel were not available to perform the inspection until hours after the 
aircraft landing, which subsequently cancelled the next flight.  TAPS generated a report of only light 
turbulence, meaning no inspection was necessary.  Based on cost estimations from a 2005 Volpe Center 
study, a flight cancellation (with an inspection) costs the airlines approximately $10,000 per occurrence 
for a narrow-bodied jet and upwards of $150,000 per occurrence for a wide-bodied jet.3  If the 
information was integrated into an airlines’ decision-making process, TAPS could have potentially saved 
the airline money in maintenance costs and the flight cancellation. 
                                                     
3 Campbell, Britney, “Safety & Business Benefit Analysis”, Volpe Center, March 9, 2005. 
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Figure 29: PIREPs vs. TAPS Overestimation 
3.3.3 The Use of TAPS for Severe Loads Maintenance Inspections 
Another benefit of TAPS is the real-time reporting of the peak loads experienced by the aircraft from 
either a turbulence encounter or abrupt maneuvering.  As previously shown, maintenance inspections 
from severe turbulence can prove costly (in time, dollars, and operational impact) to an airline, especially 
if they are unnecessary.  The TAPS report contains a specific flag that provides a notification when the 
aircraft has encountered severe loads as per the maintenance manual guidelines. 
Delta provided information concerning the number of inspections performed from 2002 to 2005.  Table 4 
shows the number of inspections performed from September 2004, when all B737-800 aircraft were 
equipped with TAPS, to February 2006.  The first row shows that 35 severe loads inspections were 
performed in that period over the entire Delta fleet aircraft.  The following rows show the number of 
inspections carried out on the three TAPS-equipped aircraft types.  Based on the TAPS information, no 
maintenance inspections due to severe loads exceeding the manufacturer’s limits occurred during this 
timeframe.  
Table 4: Maintenance Inspection Comparison 
Aircraft Type No. Inspections Needed Per TAPS 
All 35 - 
B737-800 5 0 
B767-300ER 3 0 
B767-400ER 0 0 
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3.3.4 Effectiveness of TAPS Uplink Software 
AeroTech developed and integrated algorithms on the aircraft and ground station that would 
automatically transmit TAPS reports generated from one aircraft to another within a specified range.  
Seven aircraft were installed with software that enabled the reception and interpretation of the transmitted 
TAPS reports.  This evaluation tested the process of providing TAPS information to the aircraft in real-
time for future development of displays in the cockpit.   
Based on the aircraft’s proximity to a TAPS report, the ground station software automatically determined 
when to uplink the TAPS report information.  When an aircraft received an uplinked report, an 
acknowledgement packet was generated and downlinked.  This receipt contained the original uplinked 
report information and specific calculations performed by the onboard algorithms.  The purpose of this 
receipt was to ensure the report was uplinked to the correct aircraft and validate the processing of the 
uplinked report onboard the aircraft.  On average, the transmission time interval was less than two 
minutes from when the initial TAPS report was generated to when the receiving aircraft generated the 
return receipt, which corresponds to approximately when the interpreted information would be available 
to the pilots.   
This system was able to successfully provide TAPS information to aircraft within a range of distances 
from 1000 nautical miles (to test system operation) to 100 nautical miles.  The latter distance 
approximates the maximum expected range of an ADS-B air-to-air datalink.  Table 5 lists the number of 
uplinks sent to the respective aircraft type along with the number of return receipts received.   
Table 5: Comparison of Uplink and Return Receipt Reports 
Aircraft Type No. of Uplinks No. of Return Receipts 
B737-800 1048 334 
B767-300ER 96 33 
B767-400ER 333 189 
The results in Table 5 show there was significant difficulty in consistently performing this uplink.  With 
the help of Delta engineers, several potential reasons for this inconsistency were identified; however, no 
definitive source was determined before the conclusion of the ISE.  One potential source of data loss was 
attributed to the limitations of the aircraft’s ACMS, which could not process uplinked data in close 
succession.  To improve the fidelity of the uplink reception, multiple uplinks to an aircraft would need to 
be separated by at least 30 seconds.  This delay was not accounted for in the routing rules on the ground 
station.  However, it can be concluded that there is no inherent difficulty in uplinking TAPS reports to an 
aircraft using ACARS, but a refinement of the ground station routing rules would be required to 
accommodate known avionics limitations. 
3.3.5 Vertical Wind Estimation 
During the B767 evaluation, whenever an aircraft encountered turbulence, a TAPS report was downlinked 
containing the maximum σΔn experienced and maximum σw calculated.  A total of 12,545 TAPS reports 
generated from the B767-300ER/400ER aircraft fleets were used for this analysis.  All of these reports are 
shown in Figure 30.  A linear regression was applied to the data, and a weak correlation is evident 
between the measured σΔn and estimated σw. 
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Figure 30: Comparison of Measured σΔn to Estimated σw 
Further insight can be gained in the quality of the reported σw by relating it to the σΔn experienced by the 
aircraft.  Theory4 provides a proportional relationship of σw to σΔn:  
σΔn = f(Weight, Altitude, True Airspeed, Aircraft Response)σw 
In practice, the function f is difficult to realize due to the complexity of representing modern aircraft 
response and control systems.  Using simulator data, AeroTech has developed a technique to estimate f 
for the B767 aircraft across its flight envelope.  Weight, altitude, and true airspeed are known for each 
data point since they were included in the TAPS report.  Therefore, each σw data point can then be scaled 
to an estimated σΔn (Figure 31).  A linear regression was applied to the data yielding an R2 of 0.5059. 
Results of the analysis show significant variability between the measured and estimated σΔn.  For 
example, an estimated σΔn of 0.1g is seen to correspond to a range of measured σΔn from 0.08g to over 
0.3g.  Possible sources of this error include: 
1. The data rates of the parameters used in calculating wg are too low to capture the frequencies 
containing the energy to produce the full σΔn.  This would result in estimated σΔn values 
significantly lower than the actual measured.  Most of the points lie above the line of perfect 
agreement indicating that this may be a significant effect. 
2. The angle of sideslip may not be zero, due to a turning flight or turbulence. 
3. The TAPS software did not check to ensure that the reported σw was the actual value associated 
with the reported maximum σΔn.  Checking for this condition is a complex process, especially in 
regions of continuous turbulence.  There may be occasions when the reported σw did not 
correspond to the peak σΔn.   
                                                     
4 Houbolt, John C. “Design Manual for Vertical Gusts Based on Power Spectral Techniques,” Air Force Flight 
Dynamics Laboratory Technical Report AFFDL-TR-70-106, December 1970. 
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This analysis suggests that an atmospheric parameter such as σw would not suffice as a surrogate for σΔn.  
AeroTech did not receive any flight data from Delta to investigate this further, and it was not possible to 
estimate the magnitude of the error. 
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Figure 31: Comparison of Measured σΔn to Estimated σΔn 
3.3.6 Dispatcher Anecdotal Feedback 
Solicited and volunteered feedback was collected concerning the use of TAPS information by dispatchers 
in an operational environment.  The feedback encompasses the active and post-event use of TAPS 
corresponding to 16 separate turbulence encounters.  Table 6 summarizes the feedback from different 
users based on dispatcher utilization of the TAPS information.  The four examples of use listed in Table 6 
are summarized below. 
Table 6: Summary of TAPS Usage Feedback 
Type # Events Examples of Use 
8 • Pilots requesting real-time TAPS-related information about an encounter. Turbulence Encounter 
Active Use 
2 • Maintenance including TAPS reported loads in severe turbulence logbook entry. 
3 • Dispatcher informing flight crews about TAPS information once aware of the encounter. Turbulence Encounter 
Post-Event Use 
3 • Flight Safety using TAPS report information in an NTSB injury investigation. 
Example 1: Pilots Requesting Real-Time TAPS-Related Information About An Encounter 
In November 2005, an aircraft generated a severe TAPS report at flight level 360.  Ten minutes after the 
initial encounter, the pilot informed the dispatcher of a “moderate plus” turbulence encounter between 
flight levels 320 to 380, lasting approximately four minutes.  There were six TAPS reports generated over 
a three-minute period: 1 light, 3 moderate, and 2 severe.  In a subsequent ACARS message to dispatch, 
the pilot queried if a TAPS report had been generated for the encounter and requested the peak g-loads 
reported.  This is an excellent example of the increased accuracy and timeliness of TAPS over manual 
PIREPS.  It may also indicate the beginning of reliance by dispatchers and pilots on TAPS reports for 
 29 
turbulence encounter information and quantification.  TAPS provides timely loads information that is 
currently not available to the dispatcher, pilots, etc., until sometimes days or weeks after the encounter. 
Example 2: Maintenance Including TAPS Reported Loads in Severe Turbulence Logbook Entry 
In January 2006, a TAPS researcher working at Delta observed on the TAPS ground station display an 
aircraft that had generated four TAPS reports at flight level 350: 1 light and 3 moderate.  The researcher 
reviewed the ACARS message traffic for this aircraft and found that the pilot reported “light chop” in a 
standard turbulence PIREP followed by a PIREP stating moderate turbulence with occasional severe chop 
at flight level 350.  The pilot also said that maintenance should be notified of a 10-knot overspeed and 
that a severe turbulence encounter should be entered into the logbook.  The maintenance coordinator 
confirmed the overspeed and severe turbulence encounter with the pilot.  The dispatcher then informed 
the pilot that meteorology believed that the aircraft was likely on the fringes of forming mountain waves 
and that the remainder of the flight should be uneventful.  The maintenance coordinator followed up with 
the pilot to determine if they were requesting a structural inspection, which the pilot declined; no 
inspection was performed and the aircraft continued in service.  In an interview with the researcher, the 
dispatcher stated they were pleased with the information provided to them by TAPS and that they had 
provided to the pilot the classification of the encounter and the peak loads experienced by the aircraft per 
the TAPS report.  The maintenance coordinator also told the researcher that they appreciated the 
information from TAPS and included the g-loads from the TAPS report in the maintenance log.  The 
researcher then provided a summation of the encounter to Delta’s flight safety department. 
Example 3: Dispatcher Informing Flight Crews About TAPS Information Once Aware Of The 
Encounter 
In September 2005, a TAPS researcher working at Delta solicited feedback from a dispatcher handling a 
flight that had generated a moderate TAPS report.  The dispatcher had not been monitoring the TAPS 
ground station display at the time of the encounter and stated that no PIREP had been received from the 
flight crew.  The dispatcher was convinced by the information being provided by TAPS and immediately 
relayed this information to an aircraft that was approaching the region where the report was generated.  
Even though flight operations personnel were not always using TAPS in real-time due to screen space 
limitations, once they were made aware of the TAPS information being provided to them, they could 
immediately benefit from the use of TAPS.   
Example 4: Flight Safety Using TAPS Report Information In An NTSB Injury Investigation 
In October 2005, Delta’s flight safety department contacted a TAPS researcher about a prior incident that 
occurred in which the pilot reported brief moderate turbulence with an injury to a flight attendant.  The 
researcher provided a log of the three TAPS reports generated during that flight: 2 light and 1 severe.  
After reviewing the TAPS reports, the flight safety department agreed that the encounter should have 
been classified as severe based on the g-loads experienced, even though an aircraft inspection would not 
have been necessary based on the peak g-loads in the TAPS reports.  TAPS data was then provided to the 
NTSB for its injury investigation essentially as a substitute for DFDR data.  This expedited the release of 
the DFDR back to Delta for examination by flight safety. 
3.3.7 TAPS Dispatcher Workshop Summary 
On January 9th and 10th 2007, AeroTech Research convened a workshop whose purpose was to further 
refine an industry-wide needs assessment of turbulence information for dispatchers, to identify how TAPS 
information may benefit dispatchers and rectify current system deficiencies in day-to-day operations, and 
to refine the TAPS CONOPS for dispatchers.  Attendees included seven persons with dispatch experience 
(4 active, 1 retired, and 2 airline operations center managers) from six different airlines (American, 
American Eagle, Delta Air Lines, Frontier Airlines, Pinnacle Airlines, and US Airways).  The dispatcher 
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attendees had an average of 20 years experience.  Other attendees included two NASA representatives, an 
FAA representative, an American Airlines pilot, and an ARINC representative.   
The first discussions examined the current state-of-the-art of turbulence information and products 
available to dispatchers and the perceived problems or deficiencies with this information from an airlines’ 
and individual dispatchers’ point of view.  Some significant findings included: 
• Without a clear understanding of the location of turbulence, dispatchers may flight plan using the 
limited turbulence forecast information available and leave the tactical maneuvering to the pilot 
and controllers.  Information sources may include convective Significant Meteorological 
Information (SIGMET) and Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET), turbulence 
forecasts and nowcasts (e.g., Collaborative Convective Forecast Product (CCFP)), and company 
PIREPs. 
• The threat of injury due to turbulence is a major concern to all the airlines represented.  All 
agreed that there is inadequate information available to reduce the impact to operations from 
injuries.  The number of flight crew man-hours lost due to turbulence injuries is important to 
management and a key motivator in the adoption of new technologies. 
• Pilot reports of turbulence to dispatchers (verbal or via ACARS) usually remain internal to the 
airline of the reporting aircraft and are not shared between airlines. 
• Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Traffic Flow Management do not have better tools for identifying 
the location of turbulence than dispatchers. 
• There is a clear disconnect between the quantity and quality of information being used internally 
by airlines and the information received by sector controllers in ATC.  ATC receives more verbal 
turbulence information than airlines, particularly in regions of dynamic weather. 
• Occasionally, the FAA will close a region of airspace in which aircraft have encountered severe 
turbulence.  An additional concern of dispatchers is when and where to safely re-enter that region 
of airspace once it has been re-opened. 
The next portion of the workshop reviewed the ISE of TAPS with Delta Air Lines, including a 
presentation of the TAPS ground station development efforts.  The discussions transitioned into 
understanding the operational phases in which TAPS would prove useful for dispatchers: flight planning 
and flight following.  The discussions focused on refining the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of 
the dispatchers for each phase and understanding the underlying tasks performed during each phase and 
how integrating TAPS information might enhance operations.  This was accomplished by presenting 
example scenarios that dispatchers commonly encounter and understanding their current practices, then 
discussing how their decision-making may differ with the integration of TAPS information.  The details 
of these discussions have been incorporated into the CONOPS (Section 3.3.8); however, some key 
findings included: 
1. Flight Planning. 
• Dispatchers would use TAPS as one of the tools in flight planning for selection of routes; 
moderate or greater TAPS reports would initiate a search for alternate routes. 
2. Flight Following: Aircraft Approaching Convection. 
• Dispatchers are primarily a third party information source for aircraft approaching or entering 
regions of convection.  With TAPS reports from aircraft transiting a convective region, 
dispatchers could provide quantitative turbulence information and improved re-route 
recommendations to aircraft. 
3. Flight Following: Severe Turbulence Encounters.  
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• If a severe TAPS report were generated without a corresponding pilot report (or report of 
lower intensity), dispatchers would make decisions based on the TAPS report. 
• Pilots may decide that an airframe inspection is necessary based on their experience and use 
any corresponding TAPS report for real-time comparison and verification. 
4. Flight Following: Turbulence on Arrival Path. 
• Dispatchers would provide TAPS information prior to the top of descent.  Typically, pilots 
prefer not to communicate with dispatchers below 10,000 ft. 
• Only severe TAPS reports would trigger a response or closure of an arrival corridor.  Flights 
would then either hold or divert, an airline would not allow aircraft to traverse region of 
reported severe turbulence. 
The workshop concluded with a discussion about the near-, mid-, and long-term future development of 
the TAPS (and E-Turb Radar) technologies.  Near-term applications may be realized within a year and 
included the communication of TAPS information to the flight crew via an ACARS textual message.  
Mid-term applications involved the displaying of TAPS information to the flight crew in aircraft equipped 
with an electronic flight bag (EFB).  Long-term goals would be the integration of TAPS cockpit displays, 
TAPS ground station displays, the E-Turb Radar, and the participation of ATC.  Overall, there was an 
extremely positive response to the two technologies and their potential use for enhancing flight safety and 
increasing operational efficiency.   
3.3.8 Summary of the TAPS Concept of Operations for Dispatchers 
A Concept of Operations presents an understanding of the needs for and expectations of a proposed 
technology to potential users.  This CONOPS summarizes the incorporation of TAPS into flight 
operations for dispatchers.   
3.3.8.1 Current System Description 
A dispatcher’s complete understanding of turbulence hazards is attained by listening to or reading 
turbulence reports from pilots and searching through various weather data sources.  The level of 
meteorological knowledge varies among dispatchers, even though most have had some training in 
understanding weather phenomenon and forecasting.  However, since there are insufficient means of 
integrating the available turbulence information into a logical, usable source, it becomes incumbent upon 
the dispatchers themselves to assimilate the information and accurately portray this information to the 
flight crew. 
Pilot reports of turbulence are intended to provide information concerning existing flight conditions to 
dispatchers and ATC.  Verbal PIREPs are sent to dispatchers and controllers by radio and the ACARS 
datalink system is used for textual reports.  Turbulence reports that are passed to the Flight Service 
Station are displayed on the Aviation Digital Data Service website.  Currently, there is no automated 
method of making these reports, and the flight crew must perform this duty manually as time permits. 
Since pilots must be involved in the generation of the turbulence reports in today’s environment, the 
resulting report will always be based on their subjective interpretation of the turbulence encounter.  No 
formal measure of the true aircraft response or g-loads caused by the turbulence is reported.  The reported 
location is not always reflective of the altitude and geographic region of the actual encounter.  Hence, 
several altitude levels can essentially be eliminated from the available airspace by a few non-descriptive 
reports of a rough ride.   
Turbulence encounters are also under-reported, especially in regions of convection that are rapidly 
developing and for which turbulence is expected.  In such cases, the pilot’s workload may be high from 
making tactical decisions to avoid the convective hazards in a busy region where all aircraft are 
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requesting route deviations from ATC.  The pilot may be unable to make timely and accurate turbulence 
PIREPs, especially to the dispatchers, for dissemination to other company aircraft. 
For ground personnel, high workloads may lead to reports not always being formally entered into the 
FAA database.  This has resulted in an almost exclusive reliance on radio transmissions and internal 
company-mandated PIREPs to identify areas of turbulence.  There are limited methods to communicate 
and display the turbulence information to the various users.  Therefore, the lack of shared information 
between ATC controllers, dispatchers, and pilots limits the degree of interaction the users can have when 
making decisions regarding turbulence.  Dispatchers must rely on NEXRAD reflectivity images, 
airmets/sigmets, CCFP, and inputs from pilots to understand the potential turbulence threat to an aircraft. 
3.3.8.2 Users 
Five categories of organizations are involved in the flow of information within the current turbulence 
information system: flight crew, Airline Operations Control (AOC), Air Traffic Controller, the Traffic 
Management Unit (TMU), and the Air Traffic Control Systems Command Center (ATCSCC).  For the 
purpose of these discussions, the flight crew will represent the pilots exclusively.  Figure 32 illustrates the 
connectivity among the different users and organizations within the current system.  It should be noted 
that the AOC structure might differ between airlines and most airlines lack an internal meteorological 
departments but may have on-site contractor support; however, the general communication requirements 
are similar. 
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Air Traffic Control System Command Center
Traffic Management Unit
Dispatcher
Maintenance
Meteorology ATC Desk
Sector Mgr.
Flight Crew
Air Route Traffic Control Center
Sector Controller
Clearance
Delivery
Local
Control TRACON
En Route /
Oceanic
Ground
Control
Airline Operations Center
Air Traffic Control Tower
 
Figure 32: User Connectivity Diagram 
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3.3.8.3 Interaction Among Users 
The existing system for the communication of turbulence information between key role players is 
complex.  A simplified overview of the participants and their communications paths is illustrated in 
Figure 33.  The current system requires the collaboration and interactions among various users, and the 
type of interaction depends on the task at hand and parties involved.  The information presented in Table 
7 summarizes and generalizes these interactions and the actions taken by each user class in the 
information flow of the current system.  These descriptions reflect current practices. 
 
Controllers
Supervisor
Flight Crew
ATC Command Center
Traffic Management Unit 
Dispatchers
Airline Operations Center  
Figure 33: Current Turbulence Information Flow 
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Table 7: Summary of Interactions Among Users 
Turbulence Information 
Provided/Gathered Decisions to be Made Actions 
Interaction: Flight Crew to Controller 
Provide turbulence PIREPs 
(usually verbally). 
Request for ride quality reports 
ahead (as made from other 
aircraft) or at other altitudes.  
Pilot’s view of weather radar 
reflectivity and turbulence 
display provides tactical hazard 
information. 
Request for deviation based on the 
information received and seen on the radar. 
Request for altitude change based on 
information received and seen on the radar. 
Change route around region 
of convection. 
Change altitude (climb/ 
descend). 
Prepare cabin for possible 
turbulence encounter. 
Interaction: Controller to Flight Crew 
Request for ride quality PIREPs. 
Receive ride quality reports. 
Deviation clearance. 
Altitude change clearance. 
Respond to ride reports from 
other aircraft. 
Initiate PIREP distribution by 
providing information to 
supervisor. 
Interaction: Flight Crew to Dispatcher 
Provide occasional verbal/text 
turbulence PIREPs (as workload 
permits). 
Request for ride reports ahead 
from other company aircraft. 
Request for deviation 
recommendations. 
Request for altitude 
recommendations. 
In collaboration with dispatcher, decide 
whether a region of weather (convection, 
turbulence, etc) should be avoided. 
If it is to be avoided, what is the preferred 
deviation (altitude, flight path, both). 
Get recommended routing 
and performance data for 
reroute negotiation with 
ATC. 
Execute deviation. 
Prepare cabin for turbulence, 
if necessary. 
Interaction: Dispatcher to Flight Crew 
Receive occasional verbal/text 
turbulence PIREPs from other 
aircraft. 
Ride quality requests from 
company aircraft. 
Deviation recommendations. 
Altitude recommendations. 
Decide whether the identified regions of 
weather (convection, turbulence, etc) are a 
threat to the safety of flights being followed, 
and are the affected aircraft far enough away 
to be able to route around/over/under the 
region. 
If so, decide on the best route to optimize 
safety. 
Notify company aircraft of 
potential threat(s). 
Recommend route deviations 
or altitude change based on 
meteorological information, 
and reports from other 
company aircraft. 
Interaction: Dispatcher to Traffic Management Unit 
Provide relevant weather 
information based on 
meteorological information and 
turbulence PIREPs. 
Optimize airline schedules and routing (from 
nominal) given adverse conditions (e.g., 
regions of turbulence, convection, etc.). 
Provide airline plan – reroute schedule. 
Request for route availability. 
Request for changes based on 
“restrictive flow program.” 
 
Interaction: Traffic Management Unit to Dispatcher 
Receive relevant weather 
information from airlines based 
on their internal information 
sources including turbulence 
PIREPs. 
Define a national flow plan, or, if the 
weather is contained within a center the flow 
plan can be defined within that center only. 
The plan will consist of defining: miles in 
trail, reroutes, and ground stops 
Communicate with airlines 
and execute plan. 
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3.3.8.4 Current System Deficiencies and Justification for Change 
The dynamic nature of turbulence requires flexibility by the users to plan for and navigate aircraft around 
regions of significant weather.  In order to provide recommendations to improve the quality and 
communication of turbulence information, it is important to understand where the deficiencies exist and 
to provide a justification for improving these deficiencies.  The operational environments identified in 
which TAPS will prove beneficial to dispatchers are flight planning and flight following.   
The increased situational awareness provided by TAPS will allow dispatchers to plan accordingly for the 
safety of the passengers and the aircraft they are monitoring.  TAPS will function as supplemental 
information that the user has at their disposal for making decisions about the condition and future planned 
route of the aircraft. 
Flight Planning 
The aircraft dispatcher is responsible for selecting a route that most complies with safety, passenger 
comfort, economy, and available National Air Space requirements, including restricted airspace, etc.  In 
many congested areas and very short stage lengths, routes are limited to only a few options based on ATC 
preferred routes.  During periods of adverse weather, available and/or mandatory routes may be selected 
by ATC, thus limiting the selection capabilities of the dispatcher.  If the dispatcher deems the ATC 
identified routes as unacceptable, a negotiation for a new routing through the ATC coordinator is 
initiated.  Flight plan development is usually accomplished 1-2 hours prior to departure with only limited 
knowledge, based solely on vague forecasts, of when and where turbulence might exist.  The dispatcher 
may reassess the route due to weather, turbulence, or other constants and modify these via computer 
automation up to 45 minutes prior to flight planned departure time.  Any changes desired within the 45-
minute limit must be coordinated with the TMU.  Table 8 provides examples of the deficiencies of the 
current system for flight planning. 
Table 8: System Deficiencies - Flight Planning 
Deficiencies of Current System Justification for Change 
A dispatcher has limited knowledge of the location and 
intensity of turbulence along the planned flight path 
and cruise altitude. 
Observations of turbulence conditions, in conjunction 
with forecasts, can be very useful in planning to avoid 
regions of turbulence.  However, since flights are 
planned up to 1-2 hours in advance of take-off, the 
turbulence information generated in this process will be 
speculative. 
No or inaccurate turbulence information may cause 
dispatcher and pilot to agree on insufficient fuel to 
circumnavigate turbulence, especially during 
congestion. 
Improved awareness of enroute constraints might 
require additional fuel to be considered to safely avoid 
turbulent regions. 
Flight Following 
Flight following involves the largest amount of operational time.  The dispatcher is responsible for 
monitoring the progress of the flight and providing significant weather updates to the flight crew based on 
changes to forecasts and turbulence PIREPs.  Even though small deviations around turbulent areas are 
usually negotiated between the pilot and ATC controller, the dispatcher may recommend amendments to 
the planned flight path to comply with fuel and aircraft performance capabilities. Table 9 provides 
examples of the deficiencies of the current system for flight following. 
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Table 9: System Deficiencies - Flight Following 
Deficiencies/Limitations of Current System Justification for Change 
Pilots’ decisions to navigate around convection are 
based on their airborne radar reflectivity maps in the 
cockpit.  More than 80% of all turbulence accidents 
occur in the vicinity of convection.  When approaching 
convection, currently there is no indication of the 
location and intensity of the turbulence hazards. 
As pilots navigate in and around convection, they may 
provide turbulence PIREPs to the sector controller and 
other aircraft in the vicinity as their workload allows.  
As previously mentioned, these reports may be 
inaccurate and, in many situations, lead to requests for 
deviations increasing radio frequency congestion.  In 
addition, if the convective region spans several sectors, 
pilots may not be aware of the turbulence PIREPs until 
they switch to the next sector frequency because 
controllers rarely provide information about other 
sector conditions. 
If the turbulence information was reported and 
disseminated automatically, dispatchers may use this 
information to communicate with company aircraft 
whose routes will take them through the affected 
regions, and may use the information, in conjunction 
with forecast products, to plan future flights around the 
region if necessary. 
If a region of airspace has been closed due to severe 
weather, there will come a time when the airspace must 
be reopened to air traffic.  In order to do this, a 
“pathfinder” aircraft is required.  Currently, this aircraft 
will be entering a region where there are no PIREPs, 
and there is only NEXRAD and airborne radar 
information.   
Opening the region of airspace should be based on 
knowledge of the turbulence hazards.  A “pathfinder” 
aircraft equipped with TAPS would be the perfect 
candidate to penetrate such a region of airspace.  TAPS 
will provide other aircraft, controllers, and dispatchers 
with immediate reports of the turbulence encountered 
by that aircraft.  Based on information from the 
“pathfinder” aircraft, other aircraft may be routed into 
the region safely and quickly. 
If the pilot perceives that the aircraft has experienced 
severe turbulence, a request for an inspection will be 
made to the dispatcher.  PIREPS made in this manner 
are known to be very subjective and inaccurate, and 
may not always be provided in a timely manner due to 
the circumstances of the event.  In addition, the PIREP 
may not necessarily be distributed throughout the 
system to all users. 
There is a need for immediate, accurate, and automatic 
reporting of severe loads events.  It is important to 
understand when an aircraft has encountered severe 
loads so that appropriate planning may be 
accomplished for maintenance to inspect the structural 
integrity of the aircraft and return the aircraft to 
service.  This immediate information would allow for 
improved turn around time or preparation for a change 
of equipment and possibly reduce a delay. 
The filed flight plan for all flights includes a designated 
arrival routing plan (Standard Terminal Arrival Route).  
This arrival plan transitions the aircraft from high 
altitude sectors to low and approach sectors.  In most 
cases (unless provided by the Dispatcher) turbulence 
information is not available before descending and 
switching to radio frequencies for the lower sectors 
and/or Terminal Radar Approach Control. 
Prior information of turbulence conditions that pose a 
hazard on the arrival path may allow the pilot and 
dispatcher to develop alternate safer plans in advance 
of the actual encounter, such as airborne holding, 
reroute to another arrival fix or diversion to an alternate 
airport.   
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3.3.8.5 Integration of TAPS into Current System 
TAPS will enhance a dispatchers’ situational awareness of the location and intensity of turbulence by 
providing real-time, quantitative turbulence encounter information downlinked from aircraft.  TAPS will 
remove the need for inference that is currently required to interpret turbulence information and enhance 
tactical and strategic decision-making for airspace usage and aircraft routing by enabling users to predict 
the effect of the reported turbulence on their aircraft.  Table 10 summarizes how TAPS would enhance 
dispatcher operations for certain common scenarios. 
Table 10: TAPS Enhancements to Flight Operations 
Operational Scenario Enhancements Using TAPS 
Flight Planning TAPS information (in conjunction with forecasts and observations) 
utilized to select route and altitudes to minimize turbulence impact 
on a flight.   
Light turbulence reports would be evaluated for passenger comfort, 
while moderate or greater reports would be perceived as possible 
safety issues. 
Aircraft Approaching Convection With TAPS reports, a dispatcher has improved situational awareness 
of location and intensity of turbulence encounters and may scale 
received information to determine potential impact to aircraft being 
monitored. 
TAPS reports allow dispatchers to develop improved reroute 
recommendations. 
Aircraft Encounters Severe Turbulence Dispatcher presented with objective information of severe turbulence 
encounters with supporting flight data.   
TAPS report information quickly supplied to maintenance to 
facilitate aircraft inspection and analysis. 
Turbulence On Arrival Path With TAPS information, dispatchers are capable of identifying 
turbulent and non-turbulent arrival paths.  Information on arrival 
corridor conditions may be provided to the pilots. 
Dispatchers may also understand which arrival paths could be 
closed, due to severe turbulence reports, and plan accordingly in case 
their aircraft may have to hold or divert. 
The automatic reporting of turbulence encounters by TAPS enhances and improves the overall turbulence 
information flow.  The objective reporting based on g-loads and the timely transmission of these reports 
to a ground station from reporting aircraft provides additional information to the user that may previously 
have been subjective, late, and/or unavailable.  The automatic transmission of reports decreases the need 
for interactions and streamlines communications between the reporting aircraft’s flight crew, ground 
controllers, and company dispatchers.  With the sharing of information, TAPS will provide a common 
picture of potential turbulence hazards to all users.   
The integration of TAPS information into a ground station display will not eliminate any existing 
capabilities present within the user’s current toolset; this integration will enhance them.  The full potential 
of TAPS will only be realized by the continued development and usage of the TAPS display tools, and 
this same turbulence information becoming accessible (either textually or graphically) by pilots and 
controllers. 
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4. Enhanced Turbulence Radar  
Recognizing the need to provide more reliable and relevant turbulence information to the cockpit, 
AeroTech Research, under contract to NASA, developed an enhanced turbulence algorithm that takes the 
radar estimate of 2nd moment5 and calculates real-time estimates of predicted g-load.  That information is 
then translated onto the radar display in two levels of turbulence, presented in magenta, scaled to the 
aircraft’s configuration and flight condition. 
The current turbulence mode function in weather radars relies on analyzing the measurement processed 
from the radar returns.  A small 2nd moment indicates that most of the particulates are moving with the 
same speed and direction – i.e., smooth air.  A large 2nd moment indicates a large variation in the 
particulates’ velocities – i.e., turbulence.  In current radars, if the 2nd moment value is greater than a 
defined threshold value, a region of magenta is shown on the display to indicate an area of turbulence.  
The problem with this technique is that the turbulence metric does not differentiate between aircraft types, 
e.g. a Boeing 737 would display the same magenta picture as a Boeing 777, when in fact these aircraft 
would react much differently to the turbulence.  Typically, a smaller aircraft would require a smaller 2nd 
moment to induce a severe turbulence encounter than a larger aircraft.  “The indirect and often incorrect 
assessment of turbulence has led many pilots to believe the systems were unreliable for warnings of rough 
skies ahead.”6 
4.1 E-Turb Radar In-Service Evaluation Overview 
Under the NASA TPAWS Program, AeroTech Research, with subcontractors Rockwell Collins and Delta 
Air Lines, implemented the E-Turb Radar software into a Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 “MultiscanTM” 
airborne weather radar.  Together with the capabilities of the MultiscanTM radar, the enhanced turbulence 
feature is particularly helpful in detecting turbulence within areas of low reflectivity, where the radar 
display is showing either black (less than 20 dBz) or green reflectivity levels while in Weather and 
Turbulence (WX+T) mode.  Such situations often occur in areas perceived as “holes,” where low radar 
reflectivity between convective areas may mask rapid convective development and significant turbulence.  
In areas of convection, the result is a well-defined area of magenta that truly and objectively represents 
the hazards that could lie ahead for that particular aircraft.  For the ISE version of the E-Turb Radar, full 
functionality existed at a maximum distance of 25 nautical miles. 
Three goals were established for the evaluation of the E-Turb Radar.  They were 1) to demonstrate a 
realizable and reliable turbulence detection system in operational environments, 2) evaluate the system’s 
performance using data downloaded from the aircraft, and 3) solicit subjective pilot feedback. 
The history of the E-Turb Radar system technology development is depicted in Figure 34.  The 
development of the concept algorithms began in 1998 with simulations and feasibility concept 
evaluations.  The E-Turb Radar algorithms were subsequently implemented within the radar onboard 
NASA’s B757-200 Research Aircraft and flown in a series of flight experiments. 
                                                     
5 2nd Moment is the measure of the second spectral moment estimate from the radar signal processor providing a 
reflectivity-weighted variance of the radial velocities.  This is a measure of the shear or turbulence within the 
resolution volume.  Source: Doviak, Richard J. and Zrnić, Dušan S. Doppler Radar and Weather Observations, 2nd 
Edition. Dover Publications, Inc., Mineola, New York, 2006. 
6 Croft, John. “Truer Pictures of Turbulence,” Aerospace America. April 2005, pg. 36. 
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Figure 34: History of E-Turb Radar Technology Development 
Following the start of the ISE in December 2003, a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) was conducted to 
define the design of the E-Turb Radar system installation on Delta Air Lines’ B737-800, ship number 
3708 (DAL 3708).  The approval process for a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for the installation 
of a Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 MultiscanTM radar onboard a B737-800 was completed on March 28, 
2004.  Following the STC approval, the MultiscanTM radar was installed on DAL 3708 without the E-
Turb Radar algorithms implemented, although the software for these algorithms was being written during 
this period.  A series of flights were conducted with the Rockwell Collins’ Sabreliner 50 flight test aircraft 
to test and evaluate the hardware and the software for implementation on the Delta aircraft.  An 
Operational Readiness Review (ORR) was conducted on August 11, 2004, to review and assess the 
readiness of the E-Turb Radar system for final aircraft implementation.  Technical Standard Order (TSO) 
certification was approved on August 23, 2004, allowing for commercial operational service with the E-
Turb Radar algorithms installed on DAL 3708.  The E-Turb Radar system has been operating in revenue 
service onboard DAL 3708 since August 2004. 
4.1.1 Organization 
The E-Turb Radar ISE was a collaborative effort, with significant in-kind support, between NASA, 
AeroTech Research, Rockwell Collins, and Delta Air Lines.  AeroTech held the prime contract with 
NASA for the E-Turb Radar ISE and subcontracted Rockwell Collins and Delta Air Lines to provide 
resources, expertise, software development, and assistance in the analysis and evaluation.  The 
organizational roles and responsibilities of the various participants are outlined in Figure 35. 
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• Provide flight data
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Figure 35: E-Turb Radar ISE Organizational Structure 
4.1.2 E-Turb Radar System Implementation 
The evaluation of the new radar technology involved several new key features.  The program saw the 
insertion of a new, highly automated WXR-2100 MultiscanTM transceiver technology that provides 
improved performance with many automated features and a 2nd moment detection algorithm with 
performance characteristics equivalent to the one successfully demonstrated in NASA flight experiments.  
The ISE is a direct transfer of the NASA hazard prediction algorithm technology and related hazard tables 
tailored to B737-800 commercial operations.  Additionally, real-time estimation of the aircraft’s weight 
was interfaced with the radar system to support g-load prediction. A graphical depiction of the overall E-
Turb Radar system architecture is shown in Figure 36. 
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Figure 36: E-Turb Radar System Architecture 
Figure 37 shows a diagram of the E-Turb Radar system concept.  For the ISE, the E-Turb Radar platform 
uses Rockwell Collins proprietary multiple-lag autocorrelation algorithms optimized for specific signal to 
noise ratios to improve the detection reliability of the radar.  Real-time values of the aircraft’s altitude, 
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airspeed, and weight are used in the hazard prediction algorithm to scale the 2nd moment to a predicted 
σΔn.  The E-Turb Radar features include a presentation of the predicted turbulence impact as a σΔn (the 
same hazard metric used for TAPS). 
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Figure 37: E-Turb Radar Technology System Concept 
The cockpit display of the turbulence detected by the E-Turb Radar is presented in two intensity levels.  
The thresholds for these two levels are defined as: 
• Level 1 (Speckled Magenta) 0.093 g ≤ σΔn < 0.156 g 
• Level 2 (Solid Magenta) σΔn ≥ 0.156 g 
Figure 38 illustrates the two-level threshold presentation of the detected turbulence to an aircraft’s crew. 
 
Level  2
Solid Magenta
Level  1
Speckled Magenta
Photo Courtesy of Rockwell Collins  
Figure 38: Cockpit Presentation of Turbulence by the E-Turb Radar 
As part of the initial feasibility study conducted in August 2003 with Honeywell and Rockwell Collins, 
the Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 MultiscanTM radar was selected for the E-Turb development and the 
ISE.  The components of the WXR-2100 MultiscanTM radar are presented in Figure 39. 
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Photo Courtesy of Rockwell Collins  
Figure 39: Rockwell Collins WXR-2100 MultiscanTM Radar 
4.1.3 Summary of Rockwell Collins Sabreliner Flight Tests 
As part of the E-Turb Radar System Technology Evaluation Program, flight tests were conducted in 2004 
using an engineering radar unit onboard a Rockwell Collins’ Sabreliner 50 flight test aircraft shown in 
Figure 40.  The Sabreliner aircraft is configured with two engineering stations. The first engineering 
station controls the recording of radar In-phase and Quadrature phase (I and Q) data, aircraft ARINC 429 
data, and radar display data from the ARINC 453 display bus.  The other engineering station has the 
capability to control the radar and monitor it during flight operations.  The purpose of these flight tests 
was to test and evaluate the hardware and the software for implementation on the Delta aircraft.  An 
initial assessment of the E-Turb Radar algorithms and the accompanying hazard table was also 
performed.   
Photo Courtesy of Rockwell Collins  
Figure 40: Rockwell Collins Sabreliner Flight Test Aircraft 
Eleven flights were conducted from April 14, 2004 to July 8, 2004.  Table 11 lists further details about 
each of the individual test flights, their purpose, and the resulting changes to the radar hardware and 
software configuration.  The final flight used a radar hardware and software configuration functionally 
equivalent to the system provided to Delta Air Lines for the E-Turb Radar ISE.  During this flight, many 
convective penetrations were carried out to collect corresponding in situ acceleration data for evaluation 
of the radar detection performance.  For this flight, 19 event recordings were made, seven of which were 
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suitable for an initial assessment of the radar performance yielding 15 individual data points.  There was 
no indication from the results that changes would be required to the hazard tables for the B737-800 
installation.  Additionally, results of the flight test indicated a reasonable correlation between the 
prediction of the radar and the in situ measurement below a σΔn of 0.2g.  Results and lessons learned from 
the Sabreliner flight test were used in the refinement and implementation of the WXR-2100 with the E-
Turb Radar technology on a Delta B737-800 aircraft. 
Table 11: Summary of Sabreliner Flight Tests7 
Date Location Flight Purpose Results 
4/14/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
Western Iowa and 
back 
No weather available.  Purpose 
is to evaluate turbulence 
algorithm against ground returns 
and to evaluate ability to change 
detection thresholds. 
Validated ability to detect/display 
turbulence and to change detection 
thresholds. 
4/20/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
central Indiana 
and back. 
Evaluate turbulence algorithm 
against weather targets. 
Saw erroneous returns, which lead to 
discovery of error in off-axis beam 
broadening compensation algorithm.  Saw 
erroneous spreading of turbulence 
detections in range, which lead to correction 
in range filter. 
4/22/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
southwester 
Missouri and 
back. 
Evaluate turbulence algorithm 
against weather targets and to 
check off axis beam broadening 
compensation. 
Several small weather encounters.  Some 
correlation between predicted and in situ 
turbulence.  Storms were relatively weak. 
4/23/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
southern Missouri 
and back. 
Evaluate turbulence algorithm 
against weather targets and to 
check off axis beam broadening 
compensation. 
Saw noise building during low reflectivity 
regions due to over flight hold.  Changed 
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) thresholds to 
prevent erroneous turbulence detection in 
low SNR conditions. 
4/29/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
Little Rock.  
Refueled at Little 
Rock, Arkansas 
Test new thresholds on SNR.  
Test alien filter (first time alien 
filter is operational on E-Turb 
Radar). Test modification to 
reject turbulence detection in 
areas where second range returns 
are detected. 
Penetrated strong weather cells with good 
correlation between predicted and in situ 
turbulence.  Saw erroneous detections close 
to ground on landing. 
4/29/2004 Little Rock to 
Cedar Rapids 
Test new thresholds on SNR.  
Test alien filter (first time alien 
filter is operational on E-Turb 
Radar).  Test modification to 
reject turbulence detection in 
areas where second range returns 
are detected. 
Penetrated strong weather cells with good 
correlation between predicted and in situ 
turbulence.  Saw erroneous detections close 
to ground on takeoff.  Turbulence “spoking” 
problem was traced to error where ground 
clutter suppression code was being executed 
in manual mode.  Discovered sign error with 
drift angle due to erroneous position of 
turbulence shadows near strong isolated 
storm cells. 
5/27/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
Central Missouri 
and back 
Test fixes for ground clutter 
suppression and drift angle. 
 
 
                                                     
7 Tabular Data Courtesy of Rockwell Collins and continued onto the following page. 
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Table 11: Summary of Sabreliner Flight Tests (con’t) 
Date Location Flight Purpose Results 
6/08/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
southern Illinois 
and back. 
Test fixes for ground clutter 
suppression and drift angle. 
Several strong storm penetrations with good 
correlation between predicted and in situ 
turbulence. 
6/18/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
northwestern 
Arkansas and 
back. 
Test event logger. Tested event logger acceleration triggers by 
inducing normal acceleration with stick 
pumping.  Observed several radar resets 
during flight which was eventually traced to 
chip select line control during data logging. 
7/02/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
eastern Nebraska 
and back. 
Test issues with event logger 
triggers and other minor 
threshold issues with detection 
algorithm.  Test new chip select 
code, which should prevent radar 
resets.  Evaluate detection 
algorithm at intermediate 
altitudes. 
No radar reset issues detected.  Had good 
correlation between in situ and predicted 
turbulence at cruise and intermediate 
altitudes down to 19,000 ft. 
7/08/2004 Cedar Rapids to 
central Missouri 
and back 
 
Test final software build. Had several encounters with Level 2 
turbulence and numerous smaller 
encounters.  Had good correlation between 
in situ and predicted turbulence.  Data 
logger worked correctly.  No resets 
observed. 
4.1.4 Aircraft Selection 
The aircraft selected for evaluating the E-Turb Radar was a Delta B737-800 aircraft.  DAL 3708 (shown 
in Figure 41) was selected since it was already equipped with a Rockwell Collins radar.  Additionally, it 
was one of the aircraft equipped with the TAPS reporting software, which allowed for a crosscheck of the 
two technologies during the ISE. 
Photo Courtesy of Delta Air Lines Photo Courtesy of Delta Air Lines  
Figure 41: Delta Air Lines Ship 3708 
4.1.5 Data Logger Implementation 
A key feature in the assessment of the performance of the E-Turb Radar during the ISE was the recording 
of data on the radar unit for events triggered during flight operations.  Event data was recorded during all 
phases of flight from weight-off-wheels to weight-on-wheels and was accessed and downloaded from the 
aircraft via an RS-232 port.  An Integrated Radar Data Logger, developed by Rockwell Collins, could 
store approximately 4.8 hours of reflectivity and turbulence scan data, as shown in Figure 42.  In addition 
to this radar sweep data, aircraft information regarding position, orientations, accelerations, and radar 
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mode data were recorded for accurate data evaluations.  The spatial resolution of the radar display 
information (turbulence and reflectivity) was reduced in comparison to that displayed on the aircraft due 
to the memory limitations of the data logger hardware. 
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Figure 42: Integrated Radar Data Logger Stores Reflectivity and Turbulence Scan Data 
The data logger has programmable trigger thresholds for automatic recordings based on actual turbulence 
encounters or radar predicted turbulence.  There are four triggers that can initiate a data recording of the 
E-Turb Radar data stream utilizing the data logger: 
• Magnitude of Peak Inertial Reference Unit (IRU) Acceleration, Δn ≥ 0.5 g 
• 5-second Windowed RMS IRU Acceleration, σΔn ≥ 0.156 g  
• Radar Predicted RMS Load, σΔn ≥ 0.093 g 
• Manual Activation by Crew 
4.2 E-Turb Radar In-Service Evaluation Process 
The components of the E-Turb Radar ISE analyses are: 
1. Playback of events using the data logger download data: actual events, as seen in the cockpit, 
could be replayed and snapshots of the display gathered. 
2. Pilot feedback: using solicited and volunteered reports from pilots, general feedback and 
comments were accumulated.  A brief summary is included in Section 4.3.2. 
3. Statistical analysis of radar performance using the flight data: using data downloaded from the 
data logger, a statistical analysis of the radar estimation capability was performed. 
Results from each component of the analysis are presented in the next section. 
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4.3 Summary of Results 
4.3.1 Playback of Events Using the Data Logger Downloads 
The Turbulence Event Playback Tool was used for display and analysis of turbulence events recorded by 
the Rockwell Collins’ Enhanced Turbulence MultiscanTM weather radar software.  Using the Rockwell 
Collins’ replay tool and data recorded by the data logger, it was possible to review what the radar display 
was showing during encounters recorded in flight, albeit at a reduced resolution.  The replay tool is 
capable of providing the following functions: reading the archived event data file that is downloaded from 
the aircraft, displaying the recorded reflectivity data, displaying the recorded turbulence data, displaying 
in situ aircraft data, monitoring the health of the radar, route plotting, and charting of in situ acceleration 
and radar turbulence.  A selection of representative “snapshots” illustrates the results and capabilities of 
the system. In the figures shown below, the black background color has been removed to allow the 
turbulence regions to be seen more clearly.  In the cockpit, these regions would be black. 
Figure 43 shows the recorded radar display from a DAL 3708 flight.  There are convective cells in the 
vicinity of the aircraft (denoted by the green region in the bottom left).  The dotted line is the aircraft’s 
subsequent flight path superimposed on the image.  The radar has detected regions of light to moderate 
turbulence (speckled magenta – Level 1), and a region of greater turbulence intensity (solid magenta – 
Level 2).  These regions were detected in areas of reflectivity less than 20 dBz, which is where normal 
radars show black or no reflectivity.  In fact, in this case the reflectivity in the region of solid magenta 
was 4 dBz.  This event is representative of historical accident cases where the pilot does not see a 
reflectivity signature on the radar display yet encounters significant turbulence.  The E-Turb Radar was 
capable of detecting these types of hazards.  Although the predicted region is not corroborated by the 
aircraft’s penetration of the area, the statistical analysis presented later provides a significant level of 
confidence in this enunciation. 
 
Figure 43: Representative DAL 3708 Encounter, Scan 55 
Figure 44 below shows the aircraft’s flight path deviating to the left to avoid a convective area clearly 
depicting turbulence directly ahead.  Also depicted are regions of light to moderate turbulence (speckled 
magenta), one of which lies in the flight path.  It was surmised (and supported by pilot feedback) that the 
pilot deviated around that region to avoid the encounter. 
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Figure 44: Representative DAL 3708 Encounter, Scan 83 
4.3.2 Pilot Feedback 
Feedback was elicited from pilots from interviews after the flights, onboard questionnaires, and jump seat 
observations.  Twenty-eight detailed accounts are presented in the Appendix.  Dates, flight numbers, and 
personnel names have been removed from the narrative to preserve confidentiality.  It should be noted 
that the feedback summaries began in May 2004, following the installation of the Rockwell WXR-2100, 
and before the installation of the E-Turb Radar software; subsequently, feedback and comments did not 
begin on the E-Turb Radar capabilities until after the upgrade of the onboard software in late August 
2004.  The following is a summary of the feedback received. 
During the evaluation process, the flight crews identified several issues concerning the use of the E-Turb 
Radar.  These issues include a suggested adjustment for setting the lower turbulence threshold regarding 
ride quality versus safety.  In some instances, according to the flight crews, some light turbulence was 
shown within the display as magenta, but other experienced light turbulence was not displayed during the 
flight.  The pilots felt that both encounters were about the same level of intensity.  This possibly indicates 
a need for an education and training process for future users of the system.  Lastly, many pilots requested 
that turbulence information be provided at ranges greater than 25 nautical miles.  The operational range 
for the production version of the E-Turb Radar is expected to be approximately 40 nautical miles. 
In summary, pilots generally agreed that the displayed E-Turb Radar magenta correlated well to 
experienced turbulence.  Of those that disagreed, most either felt that the E-Turb Radar did not provide 
them awareness of light chop in clouds where they expected it, or that the magenta was only painted 
where a pilot would expect to find it based on reflectivity.  It should be noted that no corresponding 
TAPS reports were transmitted from DAL 3708 during incidents for which pilots disagreed that E-Turb 
Radar correlated with experienced turbulence.  
Response to the E-Turb Radar has been positive in many respects.  Many comments by flight crews have 
noted that the display of turbulence (magenta) was shown in areas of little to no reflectivity and that the 
E-Turb Radar product depicts a better definition of magenta than existing weather radars.  Most users of 
the E-Turb Radar have stated that there was sufficient correlation with the turbulence experienced by the 
aircraft. 
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4.3.3 Statistical Analysis of Radar Performance Using the Flight Data 
Data collection for the ISE of the E-Turb Radar began on August 23, 2004.  Since then, twenty-one 
downloads of the data logger have been made.  Table 12 lists information for the date of the download 
from the aircraft, the date range covered within the data file, and the total number of data logger identified 
events captured. 
Table 12: Summary of E-Turb Radar Data Logger Downloads 
Download No. Download Date Time Span Covered Total # of Events 
1 08/25/2004 08/23/2004 – 08/25/2004 28 
2 09/02/2004 08/25/2004 – 09/02/2004 61 
3 09/17/2004 09/11/2004 – 09/17/2004 29 
4 09/29/2004 09/17/2004 – 09/28/2004 45 
5 10/12/2004 09/30/2004 – 10/11/2004 30 
6 10/26/2004 10/16/2004 – 10/25/2004 32 
7 12/02/2004 10/27/2004 – 11/25/2004 82 
8 12/16/2004 12/02/2004 – 12/05/2004 29 
9 02/11/2005 12/17/2004 – 02/10/2005 66 
10 03/31/2005 02/12/2005 – 03/24/2005 92 
11 05/12/2005 03/31/2005 – 04/23/2005 89 
12 07/14/2005 05/12/2005 – 06/02/2005 96 
13 08/30/2005 07/14/2005 – 07/25/2005 97 
14 10/14/2005 08/30/2005 – 09/25/2005 99 
15 11/14/2005 10/16/2005 – 11/14/2005 87 
16 02/10/2006 11/14/2005 – 12/31/2005 87 
17 04/01/2006 02/11/2006 – 03/31/2006 84 
18 09/05/2006 04/01/2006 – 04/21/2006 96 
19 10/26/2006 09/05/2006 – 09/15/2006 117 
20 11/20/2006 10/26/2006 – 11/02/2006 32 
21 12/07/2006 11/22/2006 – 12/04/2006 26 
The first step in the processing of the downloaded radar data was to categorize the recorded encounters.  
Rockwell Collins performed the initial analysis and categorization of the data with subsequent refinement 
and finalization performed by AeroTech Research.  In summary, 
• 1,435 turbulence events were triggered and recorded between August 23, 2004 and December 7, 
2006, 
• 347 events were determined to be invalid data and subsequently discarded, and therefore 
• 1,088-recorded events were admissible for analysis. 
Invalid criteria causing recording of the radar data stream may have come from several sources, 
including: 
• Touchdown “bumps.” 
• Radar operated in manual or stand-by mode by the pilot. 
• Flight at low altitude with the antenna pointing at ground in manual mode (possibly clutter 
induced). 
• Inadvertent manual triggers by pilots. 
The 1,088 data events identified for analysis were separated into three distinct groups for further 
statistical analysis.  Figure 45 presents the distribution of the events between the three categories.  The 
first group represents data recordings triggered by the IRU accelerometer with no display of turbulence by 
the radar.  This may have been indicative of Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) and was the group with the 
lowest number of occurrences.  The second group, represented by the hatch pattern within the pie 
diagram, was triggered by the radar detecting regions of turbulence of significant magnitude; however, 
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the aircraft did not traverse these areas, and the accelerometer data could not verify the presence of 
turbulence.  The final group, represented by the solid section of the diagram, was the accumulation of 
event data recordings when the radar displayed areas of predicted turbulence, the aircraft’s flight path 
traversed the affected areas, and the presence of turbulence was verified by the IRU accelerometer.  This 
final group of 495 events was used for the detailed statistical data analysis. 
495 Events
45.5%
484 Events
44.5%
109 Events
10.0% • Radar Displays Area of Predicted Turbulence.
• Aircraft Flight Path Traverses Affected Area.
• Presence of Turbulence Verified by IRU Accel.
• No Radar Display of Predicted Turbulence
• IRU Accelerometer Confirms Turbulence
• Indicative of CAT
• Radar Displays Area of Predicted Turbulence
• Affected Area Not Traversed
• Presence of Turbulence Not Verifiable by IRU Data
 
Figure 45: Event Categorization for the E-Turb Radar Analysis 
For these 495 cases, an analysis was conducted to determine the correlation between radar predicted and 
experienced g-loads.  Figure 46 shows the linear regression between the peak radar predicted σΔn and 
peak measured σΔn.  To minimize notational complexity in the subsequent text, we define x as peak radar 
σΔn and y as aircraft measured peak σΔn. 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
Peak Radar Predicted (g), x
Pe
ak
 In
 S
itu
 M
ea
su
re
m
en
t (
g)
, y
Raw Data*
95% Confidence Level
yhat
Predicted y Level 1 Display
(0.093 g)
Predicted y Level 2 Display
(0.156 g)
Ideal Agreement
E(y|x )= β x
* Raw Data Corrected for Forward Location of IRU 
Accelerometer
εβ +== xxyEy ˆ)/(ˆˆ
y = 0.860x
r2 = 0.795
^
 
Figure 46: Correlation of Radar Predicted & In Situ Peak σΔn 
The linear regression for the 495 turbulence event data sample produces a trend line with a slope of βˆ = 
0.860 and a correlation coefficient r2 = 0.795.  Information presented in Figure 46 indicates that the radar 
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prediction explains 79.5% of the variation in the actual experienced g-loads, with a general tendency for 
the radar to overestimate the in situ measurements (since βˆ is less than one relative to the line of ideal 
agreement of β = 1).  For an accurate assessment of the loads on the aircraft, the recorded in situ 
accelerometer data was corrected for the difference between the forward location of the IRU 
accelerometer and the center of gravity location. The correction required is 23.1 feet forward relative to 
the typical center of gravity for B737-800 operations.  The results show that the linear estimator for in situ 
accelerometer response ŷ, based on radar observables (2nd moment) x, is of the form εβ +⋅= xy ˆˆ  where ε 
is defined as the error residuals and βˆ = 0.860. 
A standard two-tailed t-test was conducted to establish a 95% confidence interval, illustrated in Figure 46, 
for the “true” slope – the estimator β.  The results strongly reject the null hypothesis (HO: β = 0) as 
opposed to an alternative hypothesis (HA: β ≠ 0) with an inference that there is convincing statistical 
evidence to indicate that radar predictions provide reliable estimates of in situ experienced g-loads.  In 
fact, for a 95% confidence interval the data indicate β = 0.860 ± 0.0385.  Also shown in Figure 46 are two 
data markers highlighting the display threshold values for Level 1 and Level 2 turbulence predictions. 
Estimating the mean values of y (actual g-load) for a given specific value of x (radar predicted g-load) is 
an important practical problem; as well as finding a confidence interval for E(y|x), the expected value of y 
given a radar x.  Based on the 495-event data sample, two confidence intervals as defined below were 
calculated: 
Case I: Find a 95% confidence interval for the estimated mean in situ g-load for a radar predicted 
x = 0.093 g, which provides the Level 1 display threshold for speckled magenta.  Direct 
calculation of the confidence interval results in 0.0765 g ≤ E(y|x = 0.093 g) ≤ 0.0835 g with a 
probability of p = 0.05 that this result was due to chance. 
Case II: Same as Case I except the radar predicted x = 0.156 g, which provides the Level 2 
display threshold.  Direct calculation results in 0.130 g ≤ E(y|x = 0.156 g) ≤ 0.139 g with a 
probability of p = 0.05 that this result was due to chance. 
The above results clearly indicate a general tendency of the radar to overestimate the experienced in situ 
g-loads due to turbulence.  The overestimates range from 10-18% for the speckled magenta threshold (σΔn 
= 0.093 g) to 11-17% for the solid magenta threshold (σΔn = 0.156 g) based on 95% confidence intervals.  
This performance was considered acceptable given all the sources of variability inherent in the system. 
Underlying the statistical influences as discussed above was a key assumption that the residual errors 
defined as y - ŷ have a standard normal distribution (Gaussian) and were independently distributed with a 
mean of zero.  Figure 47 presents a combination of the calculated normal probability distribution function 
(PDF) and a normalized histogram for the 495 events considered. 
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Figure 47: PDF Distribution of Statistical Data 
Based on the data, the mean error was μe = 0.004687 g with a standard deviation of σe = 0.0391 g.  Figure 
47 readily demonstrates the errors to be Gaussian in nature.  A diagnostic that more clearly demonstrates 
the Gaussian nature of the error residuals is provided by a Quantile-Quantile plot, shown in Figure 48. 
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Figure 48: Quantile-Quantile Plot of Residual Errors vs. Standard Normal 
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If the data points of the Quantile-Quantile plot were to fall close to the straight line (representing the 
cumulative normal probability distribution) as shown, the conjectured distribution (assumed to be 
Gaussian) was a reasonably good model for the data.  Breakup along the tails was expected given reduced 
samples available from the data recordings at high levels of turbulence.  As presented in Figure 48, the 
Quantile-Quantile diagnostic gave no reason to doubt that the error residuals are approximately normally 
distributed and the underlying assumption of the earlier analysis was supported. 
A final key result of the statistical analysis of the radar download data was the correlation of measured 
peak loads with the peak σΔn for individual events, as shown in Figure 49.  The RMS of the recorded load 
values was calculated in real-time onboard the ship’s computers and uses a 5-second buffering window.  
For additional comparison, the contents of the ISE were augmented with other historical flight data 
including data collected during previous NASA flight tests, NTSB accident investigations, and several 
other airline incidents.  A linear regression was also applied to this data yielding a correlation coefficient 
of 94.8%.  This indicated that the data collected during the ISE from DAL 3708 was consistent with other 
accident and flight test data.  The relationship of the peak loads to the peak σΔn values could prove useful 
in future analyses. 
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Figure 49: Correlation of Peak Load With Peak σΔn (5 sec. window) 
Based on the analysis of the 21 downloads from the data logger, a summary of the statistical results was 
performed.  The detection of turbulence by the radar provided a reliable prediction of the subsequent 
measured g-loads with a high degree of confidence.  It can also be summarized from the statistical 
analysis that the linear prediction model explains about 79% of the variation in the observed g-loads.  An 
analysis of the residual error diagnostics provided a strong indication that the residuals are approximately 
normally distributed – a key theoretical assumption to support the statistical analysis approach taken. 
It can therefore be summarized that the E-Turb Radar performed as per design and its intended function.  
Based on collected data, there was convincing evidence that crews were using E-Turb Radar to avoid 
indicated moderate to severe turbulence.  The data also indicated strong correlation between radar 
predicted loads and experienced loads when avoidance was not possible. 
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4.4 FAA Certification of E-Turb Radar 
The turbulence mode function on current airborne weather radars was not covered in the FAA’s airborne 
radar certification document TSO-C638; therefore, no performance standards for this function have been 
established.  This may be a contributing factor to the unreliability of the function on existing radars.  The 
successful development and demonstration of radar turbulence detection technology from TPAWS and 
the successful ISE with Delta established the technical criteria to develop the Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS) for the turbulence functionality.  In 2005, the FAA decided to develop 
MOPS for the enhanced turbulence capability.  The MOPS would be incorporated into a revised TSO-
C63 for which future airborne weather radars with turbulence functions must be certified.  To this end, the 
FAA convened a group of government and industry representatives to define the certification process and 
MOPS for the E-Turb Radar capability.  This group, the Airborne Turbulence Detection Systems (ATDS) 
Working Group, is tasked with producing the MOPS for the E-Turb Radar by September 2007. 
In addition, the FAA included in Section 17 of Advisory Circular 120-889 the actions air carriers could 
take to support emerging technologies. 
Air carriers support development and implementation of emerging technologies when they:  
• Retrofit current predictive wind shear equipped aircraft with enhanced turbulence detection 
radar 
• Assist in certification of enhanced radar 
• Conduct in-service flight trials to determine the effectiveness of new onboard radar systems 
in detecting turbulence, and the feasibility of using them… 
5. E-Turb Radar / TAPS Event Correlation Case Studies 
The installation of both the TAPS and E-Turb Radar onboard a single aircraft provided the ability to do a 
comparative analysis of the two technologies while both were in operational service.  The following 
sections present examples of turbulence encounters by DAL 3708 that were detected by both the E-Turb 
Radar and TAPS, enabling the correlation of the magnitudes of the radar predictions and TAPS measured 
detections. 
A comprehensive comparative analysis of a large ensemble of events was precluded due to a lack of a 
time value recorded within the radar data logger file.  This was due to a software anomaly, and this 
missing parameter prohibited developing an automated process for the comparison of the turbulence 
encounters based on time.  It was therefore necessary to use aircraft position records in conjunction with 
the scan time to correlate the two data sources.  The time between stored radar scans within the data 
logger files is known to be 4.4 seconds.  This process was time consuming and limited the number of 
cases that could be fully analyzed. 
TAPS and E-Turb Radar were both installed on the DAL 3708 in August 2004; however, due to the 
recording limitations of the data logger, available E-Turb Radar information was limited in quantity and 
considered a subset of the total time span covered by TAPS reports.  The distribution of TAPS reports for 
Delta Air Lines’ Ship 3708 is presented in Figure 50.  The volume of potential recorded events was 
limited since the event data file fills the available memory storage space preventing further data 
recordings until it was manually downloaded, resetting the storage space available.  In the next section, 
                                                     
8 “Airborne Weather and Ground Mapping Pulsed Radars”, TSO-C63c, August 18, 1983. 
9 “Preventing Injuries Caused by Turbulence”, FAA AC120-88A, January 19, 2006. 
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the data reduction method will be explained, leading to the selection of three candidate dates for a 
correlation study between the E-Turb Radar and TAPS technologies. 
Period Covered: August 28, 2004 - August 16, 2006
Total # of Reports: 1190
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Figure 50: Distribution of TAPS Reports for DAL Ship 3708 
5.1 Data Reduction Method 
The process to find suitable cases for correlation analysis used the entire TAPS and radar data set 
obtained between August 23, 2004, and December 7, 2006. The process was as follows: 
1. Determine candidate days when both E-Turb Radar and TAPS turbulence encounters were 
recorded.  Although this process identified the days of recorded encounters, it did not guarantee 
that the same event was recorded by both systems. 
2. Determine the total number of events recorded by each system to begin the process of 
determining potential “high value” dates.  The assumption was made that dates chosen with a 
high count of both E-Turb Radar and TAPS would yield encounters that may produce good 
correlation in space and time. 
3. Determine if any recorded turbulence encounters resulted in moderate or severe TAPS reports 
with corresponding E-Turb Radar data recordings.  A filter of the TAPS database of DAL 3708 
reports was searched, looking for instances of dates when DAL 3708 encountered turbulence and 
made TAPS reports of moderate or greater intensity level (σΔn ≥ 0.20 g).  To date, no severe 
encounter has been reported by TAPS for DAL Ship 3708.  Nineteen different encounters were 
identified with a σΔn ≥ 0.20 g over 14 different days.  Of these encounters, only one day included 
TAPS data with a σΔn > 0.20 g and a radar prediction of σΔn > 0.156 g.  For this identified date, 
there were no collocated TAPS reports and E-Turb Radar data logger recordings.  Therefore, 
there was no matching recorded data by both systems that identifies turbulence encounters of 
moderate or greater intensity. 
4. Select days to perform the manual process of comparing the recorded E-Turb Radar data with the 
TAPS reports from DAL 3708.  Days were chosen based on a high count of either of TAPS or E-
Turb Radar recorded encounters.  This process resulted in ten candidate days; three were 
admissible for a more in-depth analysis that is included in subsequent sections.  The other days 
were eliminated after reviewing plots of the aircraft’s track, recorded during the E-Turb Radar 
event, and the location of TAPS reports.  Reasons for elimination included a lack of alignment in 
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space between the TAPS report and the E-Turb Radar data logger data for a particular day, poor 
radar management (no Ground Clutter Suppression (GCS) or Automatic Mode (AUTO) selected), 
painting of the ground, and clear air turbulence encounters (i.e., no radar returns). 
5. With the available dataset narrowed, each day’s events were reviewed for correlation between 
available TAPS reports and recorded E-Turb Radar scan data from DAL 3708. 
5.2 DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounters 
Following the above outlined process, three candidate dates, out of 83 potential days, were identified and 
are listed below with the number of recorded TAPS reports and E-Turb Radar events indicated.  The 
actual dates of the turbulence encounters have been replaced by an arbitrary identifier within the 
subsequent text to preserve Delta Air Lines’ data confidentiality.  The selected dates for the detailed 
comparison are: 
• Turbulence Encounter Day A-11 with 7 TAPS reports and 4 E-Turb Radar recorded events, 
• Turbulence Encounter Day A-14 with 7 TAPS reports and 7 E-Turb Radar recorded events, and 
• Turbulence Encounter Day A-20 with 12 TAPS reports and 13 E-Turb Radar recorded events. 
For each of the encounter days presented in the following analysis, an overview figure is provided.  An 
example is shown below in Figure 51.  This figure is a representation of all the events of interest for that 
day.  The domain was defined by the aircraft’s path during that period (from position data within the data 
logger).  Unfortunately this resulted in the events and the individual TAPS reports being very compressed 
and hard to differentiate.  However, each event is presented in expanded form in the subsequent text.  The 
solid lines represent the E-Turb Radar recorded flight paths with event numbers (as determined by the 
data logger software) called out.  The length of an event (and hence the length of the line shown) was 
determined by the length of time that the radar detects a hazard.  For example, the hazard was very short-
lived in Event 44 below, but longer in Event 41.  The multiple TAPS reports are represented within these 
figures by the various markers with the magnitude of the σΔn value of the report listed within the legend.  
From the information presented within each figure, it was possible to see which radar recorded events 
align with the TAPS reports for each particular date. 
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Figure 51: Example of a Turbulence Encounter Day Summary 
Following a brief explanation of each day’s turbulence encounters, a detailed view of a particular event(s) 
is presented.  Within the detailed view figures, the TAPS reports, represented by diamond markers in both 
the main figure and the insets, are labeled as light (L) and less than light (LTL) as per the categorization 
scheme previously defined in Section 3.1.3.  The inset plots show the aircraft’s altitude in thousands of 
feet in relative position as well as a time history plot of σΔn as recorded by the E-Turb Radar data logger 
and the individual TAPS reports.  Information in these figures will allow attention to be focused more on 
detailed scans of the weather reflectivity and predicted turbulence as captured by the data logger software. 
5.2.1 Turbulence Encounter Day A-11 
The majority of events for this day were centered on a close region around Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta 
International Airport (ATL) with the concentration of TAPS reports occurring within one particular 
portion of the departure of DAL 3708 from the airfield.  During this portion of the flight, a large 
convective weather system was approaching the northern Georgia area from the southwest.  At the time of 
the aircraft’s departure, only the leading edges of the storm system were approaching the area, with the 
heavier, more dense convection still several hours away.  Figure 52 presents the path of the aircraft during 
the E-Turb Radar data recordings and the TAPS reports made from the ship during these particular 
encounters. 
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Figure 52: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-11 (E-Turb Radar Recorded Events & TAPS Reports) 
From Figure 52, Event 42 is the only event containing both E-Turb Radar data and TAPS reports.  This 
event is examined in this section.  For Event 42, a closer view of the flight path of DAL 3708 and the 
TAPS reports is presented in Figure 53.  Shown are two separate groupings of turbulence encounters by 
the aircraft as it was climbing out from ATL.  The first group occurs as the aircraft passed between five 
and ten thousand feet and the second group occurs after a brief leveling off at ten thousand feet before 
continuing.  Each of the TAPS events reported did not exceed the light magnitude category for the TAPS 
reporting system. 
Within Figure 53 (as well as the subsequent Figure 58 and Figure 63), it is apparent that there is a 
difference in the σΔn trace and the σΔn of the TAPS reports.  The difference in magnitudes was caused by 
the two separate software algorithms onboard DAL 3708 using two separate sources of the aircraft 
vertical acceleration.  Misalignment of a particular TAPS report with peaks presented within the trace of 
σΔn was attributed to the fact that the positional information within a TAPS report marks the beginning of 
incremental 30-second reporting window, not the position of the peak value of σΔn. 
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Figure 53: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-11, Event 42 Detailed View 
Event 42, as recorded by the E-Turb Radar data logger, begins just after the aircraft passes 5,000 feet on 
climb out.  The first two TAPS reports for this day were immediately visible within six nautical miles of 
the aircraft position, as shown in Scan 2 presented in Figure 54.  Additional lead in time to the event was 
not available for a full assessment of the first two TAPS reports because none of the four predefined 
triggers within the data recording software were met. 
Starting with Scan 1 of Event 42, the aircraft was near convection north of ATL.  A comparison of the 
predicted turbulence from the E-Turb Radar, albeit within a six nautical mile range, showed a good 
correlation of a Level 1 prediction to the TAPS report transmitted by DAL 3708.  The remaining four 
TAPS reports are present at a distance greater than 12 nautical miles from the current position.  The first 
two reports within this line have good agreement with the Level 1 predicted turbulence in this area. 
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Figure 54: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-11, Event 42, Scan 2 
Early during the playback of Event 42, an intense convective cell with red reflectivity remained present 
through most of the scans to the right of the intended flight path of the aircraft.  Small areas surrounding 
this region were highlighted by a Level 1 prediction.  The recorded flight path of DAL 3708 shows the 
aircraft just passing the left edge of this region. 
Scan 11, shown in Figure 55, occurs approximately 40-seconds after Figure 54.  The aircraft was 
approaching 9,000 feet with the radar in automatic mode with a tilt of one-half degree down.  Scan 11 
highlights several areas of Level 1 turbulence predicted along the flight path.  Figure 55 also clearly 
captures the potential for turbulence with the remaining four TAPS reports.  The areas highlighted with 
Level 1 predicted turbulence continue to persist over several more scans as the aircraft transits the region. 
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Figure 55: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-11, Event 42, Scan 11 
Beginning in Scan 13, recorded data indicated a region of Level 2 predicted turbulence to the left of the 
intended flight path.  Convection was still present in the area for the aircraft’s ascent.  The Level 2 area 
was located within moderate (yellow) reflectivity, not in the high (red) reflectivity and is a further 
illustration of the lack of correlation between turbulence intensity and radar reflectivity.  This region of 
predicted turbulence continued to persist for many scans during the event playback. 
Figure 56 shows Scan 23 of the playback of Event 42.  The first two TAPS reports have passed with the 
remaining four present within areas of high reflectivity.  The E-Turb Radar predicted multiple areas of 
Level 1 turbulence with some areas of Level 2 shown at farther distances to the left and right of the 
aircraft’s flight path.  The spacing of the TAPS reports’ 30-second window aligns well with the reduced 
resolution of the predicted E-Turb Radar product as shown with the playback tool.  The aircraft 
encountered light and less than light turbulence as indicated by the TAPS reports and predicted by the E-
Turb Radar.  During the remainder of the flight for Event 42, the radar remained in automatic mode, with 
the antenna tilted down. 
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Figure 56: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-11, Event 42, Scan 23 
By the time Scan 45 was reached, the aircraft was in the process of exiting the convective region.  Level 1 
predicted turbulence was still indicated on the flight path.  Additionally, an area of Level 2 turbulence 
was indicated on the right within moderate reflectivity that persisted over several more scans. 
5.2.2 Turbulence Encounter Day A-14 
On the encounter day A-14, a large weather system moved through the central plains of the United States.  
Late in the day, most of the heavy storm activity had moved out of the Kansas City, Missouri area.  
Figure 57 presents several encounters recorded by the E-Turb Radar and TAPS on DAL 3708 in and 
around this area.  The spatial distribution of the E-Turb Radar recordings covered areas near Kansas City, 
Missouri (MCI), eastern portion of Texas, and the northwestern portion of Georgia (approaching the 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport).  TAPS reports were only present for the E-Turb Radar 
recorded event number 68.  More detail on this particular event is presented below. 
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Figure 57: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-14 (E-Turb Radar Recorded Events & TAPS Reports) 
Focusing on Event 68, DAL 3708 was on departure from MCI and began encountering light turbulence as 
reported by TAPS near 17,000 ft.  In Figure 57 and Figure 58, this was indicated by the even spacing of 
the TAPS reports along the flight track history and a review of the report contents; showed the turbulence 
was continuous in nature causing a TAPS report to be generated every 30-seconds.  The turbulence did 
not subside until after the aircraft leveled off at flight level (FL) 250.  It should again be noted that the 
difference with the inset for Figure 58 was caused by the position information as captured by the TAPS 
report and the two separate sources of vertical acceleration used for the σΔn calculation. 
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Figure 58: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-14, Event 68 Detailed View 
For this encounter, the E-Turb Radar was in Automatic Mode with Ground Clutter Suppression on.  The 
first indication by the radar of turbulence was on Scan 32.  The aircraft was near 8,200 feet when a high 
density of Level 1 turbulence was indicated to the right of the intended path.  Scan 34 shows predictions 
along the flight path for more than 12 nautical miles.  The radar configuration was still in Automatic 
Mode with a tilt of 0.25 degrees down.  Level 2 turbulence was later predicted in Scan 37 to the right of 
the flight path.  The more intense turbulence region persisted for several more scans and was located in 
regions of weak (green) reflectivity. 
Approximately six to twelve nautical miles to the right of the aircraft’s position, Level 2 regions of 
predicted turbulence were indicated within the data recording before and after Scan 41, shown in Figure 
59. A region of Level 2 prediction at a distance greater than 20 nautical miles was also present but 
changed as the aircraft continued to climb out.  The contents of Figure 59 indicate that the aircraft 
continued to penetrate the region of weak reflectivity and would potentially encounter light turbulence as 
shown by the speckled Level 1 turbulence product.  An overlay of the TAPS reports confirms that in 
subsequent minutes to follow, DAL 3708 did encounter light turbulence on climb out. 
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Figure 59: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-14, Event 68, Scan 41 
Figure 60 captures the radar display seconds after the image presented in Figure 59.  Turbulence in the 
area within the weak reflectivity regions was intensifying at 15 to 20 nautical miles from the aircraft’s 
position.  The aircraft continued to climb as well as increase its airspeed.  The Level 1 prediction from the 
E-Turb Radar continued to cover most of the viewing area in and around the convective cell.  The first 
TAPS report was made approximately six nautical miles from the current aircraft position and the weather 
radar was tilted 1.75 degrees down with GCS on. 
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Figure 60: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-14, Event 68, Scan 47 
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As the aircraft continued its climb out, Scan 57 (not shown, but similar to Figure 60) was representative 
of the Level 1 prediction present along the flight path and only green reflectivity was in the area.  The 
Level 2 predicted regions of turbulence within the direct path of the aircraft persists over many scans and 
links spatially to the 0.194g TAPS report.  The aircraft did not deviate and continued the climb. 
As the aircraft continued the climb out, the earlier predicted area of turbulence changed.  The region of 
Level 2 turbulence prediction persisted as the aircraft traversed the area.  Figure 61 shows that the aircraft 
encounters the predicted Level 2 region in less than ten nautical miles and experienced a σΔn of 0.194g, as 
noted within the TAPS report.  This was a light TAPS report that was well correlated with a Level 2 
prediction by the E-Turb Radar technology.  The intensity of the continuous turbulence remained for the 
next several minutes until the aircraft exited the region, past the end of the data logger event file. 
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Figure 61: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-14, Event 68, Scan 67 
With the aircraft exiting the region, Scan 80 indicated moderate reflectivity in conjunction with a Level 2 
prediction in proximity to the 0.194g TAPS report, i.e. less than six nautical miles out.  
5.2.3 Turbulence Encounter Day A-20 
The turbulence encounters recorded from DAL Ship 3708 on the A-20 date, were the most numerous for 
an individual day out of the dataset of possible candidates examined.  On this particular date, a large 
storm system from the central portion of the United States was moving quickly through the southern 
states.  The size of the weather system increased throughout the day and during the time of the majority of 
the TAPS reports made by DAL 3708.  The weather system was centered over western Georgia, 
stretching from the Gulf of Mexico north to Tennessee and back towards Missouri. 
Figure 62 is a summary plot of the position of DAL Ship 3708 during various recordings by the E-Turb 
Radar data logger with reported TAPS reports for the day overlaid on the positional grid.  The majority of 
events presented in Figure 62 were located within the states of Georgia and northern Florida.  Events 78 
and 79 with the associated TAPS reports were selected for further investigation due to the number of 
TAPS reports in close proximity to one another. 
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Figure 62: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-20 (E-Turb Radar Recorded Events & TAPS Reports) 
Further analysis for Encounter Day A-20 will include sequential Events 78 and 79.  One TAPS report is 
located at the end of Event 78 and the remaining six reports are contained in Event 79. As shown in 
Figure 63, a series of TAPS reports align with the flight track history of the aircraft as it was traversing 
the airspace in the direction of Jacksonville, FL.  The aircraft was in a cruise condition at/near FL360. 
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Figure 63: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-20, Events 78 and 79, Detailed View 
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A review of both events using the recorded scan data indicated that no significant areas of reflectivity 
were displayed within the direct path of the aircraft.  However, a convective area (containing weak to 
moderate reflectivity) was displayed to the right of the aircraft track within the recorded events.  Focusing 
on the playback of scan data from Event 79, the second TAPS report, measuring 0.176g, was present 
(Figure 64) within a region of Level 1 prediction by the E-Turb Radar in Scan 2.  The 30-second window 
used by the TAPS calculation would place the TAPS report directly in the middle of the predicted area.  
As the aircraft progresses, the next four TAPS reports made by DAL 3708 came into view.  Beginning 
with Scan 35, playback data showed each of the reports within dense areas of predicted turbulence.  The 
prediction persists for several more scans with an estimated warning distance of 12 nautical miles. 
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Figure 64: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-20, Event 79, Scan 2 
Figure 65 illustrates Scan 39 from the recorded E-Turb Radar data with the location of four TAPS reports 
overlaid post-flight within the image.  The last TAPS report of this region was outside of the 25 nautical 
mile range of Figure 65 by only a few scans.  The first encounter as recorded by TAPS had already 
passed.  Level 1 predicted turbulence was indicated through the first 12 nautical miles of the display, with 
the majority of the advisory region located to the right of the flight path with the wind (direction indicated 
in the upper left corner of Figure 65) causing advection of the air mass across the aircraft’s flight path.  
The E-Turb Radar indicated the potential for Level 1 turbulence (σΔn ≥ 0.093 g) for the next 12 nautical 
miles.  The predicted region persisted for several scans before and after the image shown in Figure 65.  
Placement of the TAPS reports made by DAL 3708 from the flight indicated a mix of less than light and 
light turbulence was encountered in this region. 
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Figure 65: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-20, Event 79, Scan 39 
Figure 66 continues to indicate a region of speckled (Level 1) magenta.  The TAPS reports overlaid in 
Figure 66 clearly match the Level 1 criteria (σΔn > 0.093 g) for the E-Turb Radar.  The last TAPS report 
for the series of recorded radar events was now visible within the scan range; however, it should be noted 
that the radar was still configured for manual mode with a tilt of 2.75 degrees down.  Figure 66 is an 
example of the E-Turb Radar’s capability to detect turbulence in regions of weak reflectivity (less than 20 
dBz). 
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Figure 66: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-20, Event 79, Scan 46 
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Continuing the review of Event 79, areas of Level 2 prediction appeared near the flight path in scans 50 
and 51.  This was about six nautical miles from the aircraft’s position.  A similar area repeats the 
scenario; closer to the aircraft in scans 56 and 58. 
As shown in Figure 67, Scan 56, Level 2 turbulence was predicted along the flight path for several scans.  
The reduced resolution of the data logger’s capture of the event did not allow for a clear estimate of the 
position of the predicted region relative to the flight path six to eight nautical miles out.  The scans 
following Figure 67 indicated (as shown by the altitude position readout in the right hand portion of the 
figure) that the aircraft was beginning a change in altitude from FL360 to FL380, possibly in an effort to 
avoid the turbulent region indicated by the radar.  The only radar reflectivity present at altitude was 
located off on the right of the aircraft’s flight path.  The E-Turb Radar predictions in Figure 67 were made 
in areas of weak reflectivity. 
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Figure 67: DAL 3708 Turbulence Encounter Day A-20, Event 79, Scan 56 
The aircraft’s course continued to hold steady on its flight path but the aircraft climbed 2,000 feet as the 
turbulence persisted.  As the aircraft climbs, the predicted amount of turbulence decreases as well as what 
was encountered by the aircraft.  The aircraft leveled out at FL380 and encountered turbulence (reported 
as less than light by TAPS) that was detected by the E-Turb Radar in scans 84 through 87, but only three 
to four nautical miles out from the aircraft’s current position.  During the flight level change, the radar 
was continuously tilted 2.75 degrees down with Automatic Mode off. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
From August 2003 to December 2006, In-Service Evaluations of two technologies developed in NASA’s 
Turbulence Prediction and Warning System element of its Aviation Safety and Security Program were 
conducted.  The two technologies were the Turbulence Auto-PIREP System and Enhanced Turbulence 
Radar.  NASA and AeroTech Research established an industry team comprising AeroTech, Delta Air 
Lines, Rockwell Collins, and ARINC to conduct the ISEs.  The technologies were installed on Delta 
aircraft and their effectiveness was evaluated in day-to-day operations.  The TAPS and E-Turb Radar 
ISEs represent an extremely efficient and successful collaboration of government and industry.  Cost-
sharing by all participants greatly leveraged the resources provided by NASA and led to a wealth of data 
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and significant results obtained in a “real-world” operational environment.  This report documented the 
establishment and conduct of the ISEs and presented results and feedback from various users. 
Between 1998 and 2003, as part of the work performed in the TPAWS program, a turbulence hazard 
metric was developed, tested, and validated in simulations and flight tests.  This loads-based hazard 
metric (σΔn), which is used by both TAPS and the E-Turb Radar, quantifies the intensity of the turbulence 
effect on an aircraft.  Prior to the ISEs’ commencement, analysis demonstrated that σΔn was a suitable 
surrogate for peak loads, and the data collected during the ISE further solidified that correlation.  The 
FAA, in its E-Turb Radar certification requirements, has also adopted this hazard metric.   
During the ISE, TAPS was successfully implemented on three Delta aircraft fleets (B737-800, B767-
300ER, and B767-400ER).  The content of the TAPS reports was established early in the evaluations 
based on stated needs from multiple Delta users (dispatchers, pilots, flight safety, maintenance, and 
meteorology).  The TAPS-WebASDSM display facilitated the evaluation of the TAPS information and 
functions by Delta Air Lines operations personnel.  The display was available via the Internet and access 
was provided to 135 Delta dispatchers and other Operations Control Center personnel.  The ability to 
automatically uplink TAPS reports to aircraft, which is a component of the future architecture of TAPS, 
was demonstrated using an ACARS datalink.  In summary, the results of the TAPS ISE are: 
• TAPS has flown onboard 123 Delta aircraft for more than 600,000 flight hours.  More than 
77,000 TAPS reports were generated during the ISE. 
• TAPS reports were received by aircraft over four continents. 
• On average, 32 TAPS reports were generated per month per aircraft.  Each TAPS report was less 
than one kilobit. 
• A method was developed to identify spurious reports generated from databus dropouts and 
incorrect sensor data.   
• Significant differences were documented between a pilots’ perception of experienced turbulence 
and the actual measured accelerations.  The latency in which verbal turbulence pilot reports was 
provided to dispatchers was also observed. 
• For the entire evaluation period, no TAPS-equipped aircraft generated a TAPS report that 
indicated a need for a severe loads maintenance inspection, although many of these aircraft were 
inspected at the request of the captain. 
• For the uplinking of TAPS report information, the average transmission time from when the 
initial TAPS report was generated to when the information was interpreted on the receiving 
aircraft was less than two minutes. 
• A vertical wind estimator, using validate calculation techniques, was implemented on 52 TAPS-
equipped aircraft.  The estimation of aircraft loads from calculated vertical winds using standard 
ship-system data yielded poor correlation. 
• A TAPS Concept of Operations for dispatchers was developed.  Dispatchers from seven airlines 
participated in its development, and the results reflected a broad consensus of industry needs and 
how the integration of TAPS would improve operations. 
The ISE proved that TAPS could automatically provide timely, objective loads-based turbulence 
encounter information to both the Operations Control Center and to other aircraft.  TAPS can increase a 
dispatchers’ situational awareness concerning the location and intensity of turbulence hazards to aircraft 
and potentially assist in avoiding turbulence and in the prevention of injuries from encounters with 
turbulence.  The volume of TAPS reports generated per aircraft is negligible when compared to the 
totality of data downlinked routinely today.  The identification of spurious TAPS reports improved the 
awareness of the aircraft system’s performance, since many of these issues might have gone unnoticed 
until the next scheduled maintenance.  Results validate and quantify the historical understanding that 
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verbal PIREPs of turbulence do not accurately reflect the turbulence in intensity due to the subjective 
interpretation.  There is no inherent difficulty in uplinking TAPS reports to an aircraft using ACARS 
datalink from a data management and throughput perspective.  However, some aircraft avionics suites 
have software limitations that can impede multiple uplinks of data.  Installation and use of TAPS on 
commercial aircraft can enable a significant reduction in maintenance man-hours, costs, and impact on 
operational schedule by providing real-time, quantitative notifications to airline maintenance of the need 
for severe loads inspections.  Typical commercial airliners are not suitably equipped to make reliable 
estimates of vertical wind.  Dispatchers from a variety of airlines acknowledged that TAPS would 
enhance the current turbulence information flow by providing timely information, streamlining 
communications and interactions among users, and presenting a common picture of potential turbulence 
hazards through shared information.  The sharing of TAPS information would provide improved 
situational awareness of turbulence encounters for all participating airlines. 
During the ISE, the E-Turb Radar algorithms were successfully implemented on a Rockwell Collins 
WXR-2100 radar and the system was installed on one Delta B737-800 aircraft, which was also equipped 
with TAPS.  In a departure from the conventional magenta turbulence regions display on current radars, 
the ISE E-Turb Radar display presented two-levels of magenta turbulence indications.  Light-to-moderate 
turbulence was indicated by speckled magenta regions, and moderate or greater turbulence by solid 
magenta.  In summary, the results of the E-Turb Radar ISE are: 
• Delta Air Lines Ship 3708 flew over 6,000 flight hours with the E-Turb Radar. 
• The E-Turb Radar functions and performance received very positive feedback from pilots.  
Anecdotal and measured data indicated that pilots developed confidence in the turbulence 
indications and were using the radar to avoid detected turbulent regions. 
• Over the course of the E-Turb Radar ISE, 1435 events were recorded and downloaded from Delta 
Air Lines Ship 3708. Applying a data assessment and reduction process, 495 events were suitable 
to be used for the statistical analysis of the radar’s performance because in these events the radar 
displayed areas of predicted turbulence, the aircraft flight path traversed the affected areas, and 
the presence of turbulence was verified by the on-board accelerometer. 
• From the statistical analyses, it was shown that there was a general tendency for the radar to 
overestimate the experienced in situ g-loads due to turbulence.  The overestimates range from 10-
18% for the speckled magenta threshold (0.093 g ≤ σΔn < 0.156 g) to 11-17% for the solid 
magenta threshold (σΔn ≥ 0.156 g) based on 95% confidence intervals.  This performance is 
considered acceptable given all the sources of variability inherent in the system and the fact that it 
provides a more conservative estimate of the turbulence intensity. 
• Based on the positive performance and acceptance of this system, NASA, Rockwell Collins, and 
AeroTech are participating in the FAA’s Airborne Turbulence Detection Systems working group 
to develop Minimum Operating Performance Standards for FAA Technical Standards Order C-
63.  Performance of the E-Turb Radar evaluated in the ISE has met and surpassed the draft MOPS 
criteria. 
• The E-Turb Radar was able to detect and provide turbulence hazard awareness in areas of weak 
reflectivity (below the threshold for reflectivity display on current weather radars). 
• Several events are presented in this report where there were radar detections of turbulence and 
subsequent TAPS reports made by the aircraft.  These events showed strong correlation between 
the radar’s indication and subsequent TAPS reports made. 
The E-Turb Radar is a stable and useful product for flight crews to mitigate the potential effects from 
turbulence encounters.  Recorded data and discussions with pilots indicate that E-Turb Radar enhances 
pilots’ situational awareness of turbulence hazards to their specific aircraft.  The E-Turb Radar provides 
information that pilots can use to make tactical deviations to avoid potentially hazardous turbulence.  It is 
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highly likely that the improved situational awareness of turbulence and the ability to avoid some 
convective induced turbulence could lead to a reduction in flight attendant and passenger injuries.  
Expanding the turbulence detection capability from 25 to 40 nautical miles is desired by users and 
supported by industry and could improve the usefulness of the technology for deviations and avoidance of 
turbulence, and therefore improve flight safety and efficiency.  The use of a common hazard metric (σΔn) 
allowed for direct comparisons to be made between the turbulence detected by the E-Turb Radar and 
encountered turbulence identified by the TAPS.  The two forms of turbulence information can be used 
together to further extend (beyond 40 nautical miles) and improve pilots’ situational awareness of 
turbulence. 
The Turbulence Auto-PIREP System and Enhanced Turbulence Radar worked as designed and achieved 
favorable feedback from users.  The adoption and utilization of these technologies could enhance 
dispatchers’ and pilots’ situational awareness of hazardous turbulence.  The improved situational 
awareness could result in a reduction in turbulence related injuries and maintenance costs, extend aircraft 
service life, and improve operational efficiency.  Due to their success in the ISEs, both TAPS and E-Turb 
Radar are technologies recommended for airline implementation by the FAA, as stated in Advisory 
Circular 120-88.  With the integration of these technologies into aircraft and ground station systems, 
aviation safety and operations efficiency will take an important step forward in the 21st century. 
7. Future Work 
7.1 Integrated Cockpit Display 
One of the most significant findings of the ISEs was the compatibility and comparability of the hazard 
metric (σΔn) from both TAPS and E-Turb Radar.  As discussed in Section 2, the calculation of σΔn in 
TAPS uses a temporal window of five seconds and E-Turb Radar uses a spatial window of one kilometer.  
One of the reasons for the choice of these windows was to be able to compare the two data products 
directly, within the constraints of the measurement methods (temporal vs. spatial).  Despite selecting 
compatible windows, the assumption was that the difference in measurement techniques did not guarantee 
compatibility.  Results in Section 5 confirmed this assumption, and the compatibility was demonstrated. 
These findings also lead to the prospect that data products from TAPS and E-Turb Radar could be 
integrated into a single cockpit display of turbulence hazard.  Such a display would provide the pilot with 
turbulence hazard information out to an unlimited range.  The long-range display of TAPS reports would 
provide indications to the pilot of turbulence-affected regions (in conjunction with weather forecast 
products).  As the aircraft approaches and enters the region, the display of TAPS reports from other 
aircraft in the vicinity will provide real-time information of the turbulence to be expected in those 
locations.  Within 40 nm, the E-Turb Radar would provide the “super-tactical” information for the pilots 
(within the limitations of radar detection ability in the atmosphere). 
NASA is currently funding AeroTech to develop and evaluate such a display under a Phase II SBIR.  This 
work is being carried out in such a way that, as other turbulence detection systems become available (e.g., 
Light Detection And Ranging (LIDAR), ground-based radars, infra-red sensors, etc.), the approach can be 
readily extended to include that data. 
7.2 Next Generation Airspace System 
Together, the TAPS and E-Turb Radar technologies represent a step in the FAA’s vision that each aircraft 
be an information “node in a network”, by providing and sharing real-time turbulence information to 
other aircraft and ground operations.  In the future, there may be technology developed to enable aircraft 
to “share” the E-Turb Radar detected turbulence hazards with other aircraft, dispatchers, air traffic 
controllers, and traffic flow managers.  This is an important concept in the FAA’s Next Generation 
Airspace System for which turbulence is identified as an important consideration. 
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Appendix 
Delta Air Lines’ Flight Crew Feedback on E-Turb Radar ISE 
The following is a listing of feedback received from DAL 3708 flight crews and ISE jump seat observers 
(Delta project personnel).  These data were gathered by the Delta project personnel and passed along to 
the NASA TPAWS program.  Pilot feedback was typically provided within several days of a flight on 
DAL 3708, either by means of a questionnaire or follow-up interview conducted with Delta project 
personnel.  From these “raw” data, presented without amendments or additional annotation, the overall 
conclusions presented in Section 4.3.2 of this document were drawn. 
 
ID:1  Source: Pilot Feedback 
Flew 3708 (Multiscan ship) a couple nights ago from SFO to JFK around significant weather in 
the mid-west; it was nighttime and the radar was needed. I was very impressed by the multi-scan 
capability. It lived up to the billing – much better than the normal 737NG radar! A definite safety 
benefit in the information presented and ability to analyze returns. 
ID:2  Source: Pilot Feedback 
All positive feedback, not one negative review of any kind 
ID:3  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Conditions: encountered several cells over the Midwest, did not enter IMC at any point while 
deviating 
1. Both pilots were very pleased with the Multiscan’s automated capabilities 
2. Weaving between cells, the captain remarked that he did not “buy” a particularly sharp 
gradient in reflectivity within one echo. 
3. Pilots were impressed by the much better defined magenta available in WX+T mode 
compared with other radar units. In this case, magenta was painted only within the most 
reflective portion of the cells 
ID:4  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Conditions: encountered a few isolated cells enroute, deviation not necessary at any time 
1. Positive comments about system capabilities and special features 
2. On climb out from SFO, in auto mode, first officer remarked that he saw exactly what he 
wanted to see on the radar screen given some small buildups east of the Sierra Nevada 
mountains 
3. First officer remarked that the gain control had better credibility than previous systems. On 
other units, changing the gain did not always result in the echoes showing proportionally 
more or less reflectivity 
4. Painted magenta in areas of little or no reflectivity near Atlanta (but did not transit areas) 
5. Despite a few small, distant cells enroute, overall basis for evaluation was disappointing due 
to scanter than expected convection around Atlanta 
ID:5  Source: Pilot Feedback 
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I used the new radar and liked what I saw under the conditions that I used it on. I came back to 
ATL on a day with a lot of cells in the area and the auto feature was great. When I was above 
developing cells that were close by the radar would never over scan them and when I descended 
below the bottoms of some of the cells it did a nice job of showing me, even though I was below 
them, where they where located. I have clearly defined cells displayed that matched what was 
outside. 
ID:6  Source: Pilot Feedback 
I used the new radar going to CCS. It is extremely sensitive and displayed even minor weather as 
heavy. Had we not switched back and forth between traditional settings and the new self scan, we 
would have deviated a long way around weather that was either well below us or minor. Perhaps 
if we had more information it would be a better tool. Overall it is too sensitive (just my opinion). 
ID:7  Source: Pilot Feedback 
First leg with AC3708 with new test radar. We were deviating for weather in JAX center airspace 
on freq 127.87. Jax directed us to go direct to a fix on the RDU arrival. We were painting a strong 
isolated cell on the requested course and stated we could not accept that routing. JAX then 
directed 15 degrees left for traffic. The cell was too close to this turn and we said we were unable 
to comply. The controlled then became agitated and asked us if we were using our emergency 
authority to contradict an ATC directive. I replied with an affirmative response. We were able to 
take his original requested course within 10 to 15 miles after passing the cell. A contributing 
factor was this radar with auto tilt. It tends to tilt lower and paint a lot more weather than I 
normally see at cruise. After switching to manual tilt with a 0 tilt angle, the strong cell almost 
disappeared from our display. 
ID:8  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Pilot said that the [Rockwell Collins] WXR700 (conventional unit on 737NGs) tends to be too 
sensitive. Often, it will paint red in a certain spot, and when crews have to penetrate the area they 
find only light-moderate precipitation. Interestingly, and in contrast to some other feedback 
received on the Multiscan, he said he did not encounter this problem during either of the two 
flights that he was aboard ship 3708 with the Multiscan radar installed. To him, it showed a much 
more realistic picture than the previous radar. 
Important unknowns in this kind of feedback are the gain settings that were used on both the 
Multiscan unit and the conventional WXR700 radar. During previous jump seat rides, I noticed 
the gain setting on the Multiscan unit spun to its highest level of sensitivity, particularly at higher 
altitudes. Awareness of the Multiscan’s automatic gain feature, which automatically compensates 
for reduced reflectivity at higher altitudes and colder temperatures, may be lacking. Further 
emphasis on setting the gain to “CAL” and leaving it there may be needed. This potential 
variation in gain settings may be a leading cause of the kind of anecdotal feedback regarding 
radar sensitivity currently being received. 
ID:9  Source: Pilot Feedback 
When asked where the gain was set during the event mentioned in the crew report, the captain 
stated that it was at CAL in auto mode, where it remained when put in manual mode. The pilot 
cited the automatic gain, as well as OverFlight protection features as factors in the reduced 
reflectivity that resulted when the radar was placed back in manual mode. The captain further 
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stated that as soon as he denied the controller’s clearance by exercising his emergency authority, 
the controller asked other Delta aircraft (presumably transiting the area that the radar had 
predicted as hazardous, though there’s no way to be certain) for ride reports. All aircraft 
responded that the ride was smooth, and after about one minute of deviating, the captain accepted 
direct to the fix where he’d previously been asked to proceed. When asked if the aircraft 
penetrated the area where the radar had painted high reflectivity, the captain responded that they 
skirted the edge of that area but did not penetrate the “core.” 
It was explained that his issue underscores a broader, more fundamental change in terms of what 
the new radar is communicating versus previous radars. That is, raw returns are being replaced by 
hazard assessments, and the E-Turb will enhance that effect even more. 
Assessing the particular situation with which the captain was confronted, the other Delta aircraft 
that were in the vicinity of the cell could have been just above (or just past) something that was 
about to give them a very rough ride, as predicted by the Multiscan. Since the captain deviated, 
we’ll never know. Also, conditions were IMC, so there was no way to visually verify the top of 
the cell in question. 
The other possibility, of course, is that perhaps the radar is too sensitive, as has occurred in the 
past with the introduction of GPWS and TCAS systems. 
ID:10  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
While in AUTO mode with the gain set to CAL, a cell with strong echoes was detected ahead and 
to the left of the flight path. At the time, the aircraft was in IMC at FL330. Taking the radar out of 
AUTO mode and leaving the gain at the same setting, the cell nearly disappeared, showing green 
and a hint of yellow with the tilt at 0 degrees, -1 and then -2. The cell essentially blended in with 
other light echoes all around. Cranking the gain to the highest setting was required to display the 
same reflectivity as in AUTO mode at that altitude, and the captain remarked that he normally 
would leave the gain alone (at the calibrated setting) on the previous radar, adjusting the tilt 
downward to detect the hazard instead. Again, operating the radar in this fashion yielded very 
benign echoes, and both pilots remarked that, without the advisory information provided by the 
Multiscan's automatic functionality, they would have had no reservations about transiting the area 
where the radar had painted nasty weather while in AUTO mode. 
We weren't really certain what to make of the system at this point, wondering whether the unit 
was in fact too sensitive. 
ATC then issued a clearance to FL410, at which time we popped out on top of the cirrus. At the 
same time, the top of the echo that the Multiscan had detected as hazardous became visible, 
ending in an anvil at about FL430 or 440. 
ID:11  Source: Pilot Feedback 
I had the opportunity to use the new wx radar from LAX-SLC. The new wx radar is a big 
improvement over the older radar system on the 800 fleet. The auto-tilt feature significantly 
reduces crew workload in a convective weather environment and the wx display is much more 
accurate in terms of where the actual cells are located and what degree of convective activity they 
contain. The new radar provided the crew with very accurate wx/turb information minimizing the 
disruption to cabin service and the chance for turbulence related injuries to the crew and pax. It's 
a great system and I hope when economic conditions improve, this system can be retrofitted on 
the remainder of the 800 fleet. 
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ID:12  Source: Pilot Feedback 
Paraphrased from actual crew report: Liked the Multiscan radar, and felt it did an excellent 
job of distinguishing cells at long range. Very dissatisfied with the turbulence feature, however, 
which did not show the continuous light chop that was experienced in cumuliform clouds at mid-
altitudes (15,000-25,000 feet). Turbulence was painted in cells, but that should be fairly obvious. 
Did not feel that the feature was of any value, since the turbulence was painted only where one 
would expect to find it, and did not correlate with the light turbulence that was experienced. 
ID:13  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Despite very little weather reflectivity throughout the flight, magenta was painted in one area near 
Atlanta while it was not present in a cumuliform cloud that the pilot felt would be turbulent. Upon 
entering the cloud in question, the turbulence was relatively smooth. 
ID:14  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Context: Rome Arrival into Atlanta, lots of convection and turbulence associated with the 
northeast quadrant of Hurricane Ivan. An unprecedented number of TAPS reports on this arrival, 
with several moderates as the day progressed (including one moderate from ship 3708 on flight 
954, ATL-LGA). A request for ride reports yielded “moderate turbulence all the way in until 
turning final.” 
Multiscan Performance: The Multiscan automated functionality worked flawlessly throughout, 
significantly reducing pilot workload in some very challenging airspace. 
E-Turb Performance: Descending from 27,000 to 23,000 feet, speckled (but sparsely 
distributed) magenta began being depicted in areas of very low and nil reflectivity. When we 
transited the area, the bumps were very, very light, not unlike turbulence we had been 
encountering for some time in similar IMC conditions. Because of building weather over ERLIN 
intersection, ATC then vectored us 20 degrees left of course, which brought us directly into an 
area of more concentrated speckles. Recognizing this, the first officer asked for 20 degrees right 
of course as an alternative, which would have taken us very close to the heavier reflectivity at 
ERLIN but avoided turbulence (since there was none predicted in that area). ATC denied the 
request, and there was good correlation between the speckles and what we experienced. A glance 
at the altimeter during this encounter read 19,300 feet (in the course of a descent). 
During the remainder of the descent, which included a few minutes in VMC between layers, very 
little if any magenta was depicted. Throughout this period, the flight crew and I felt that the 
turbulence experienced was just as intense as the area where concentrated speckles had been 
displayed previously. 
Additionally, ATC advised traffic on frequency of a microburst 1 mile to the northeast of 
runways 8L and 8R (on the north side of the field). A speck of magenta was apparent in this 
vicinity while on final. 
ID:15  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Observed isolated cells, separated primarily by VMC conditions, at altitude. The captain 
remarked that the Multiscan did an outstanding job of painting the cells as they actually appeared, 
including the overhang typical of thunderstorm tops. Using the previous radar, this overhang went 
virtually undetected. 
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Despite coming within 25 nautical miles of the storms, no magenta was depicted within these 
cells. 
Also, both pilots had flown ship 3708 previously, and were very impressed with the Multiscan’s 
capabilities. The captain mentioned a flight in August from LAX to GDL (Guadalajara, Mexico) 
during which the new system was especially helpful. While descending into GDL, the crew’s 
workload was significantly reduced thanks to the cancellation of ground returns in the vicinity of 
thunderstorms and mountainous terrain. 
However, the captain also mentioned a flight during which strong returns were painted even 
though the tops were well below the altitude of the aircraft. He recounted that the aircraft was 
cruising at about FL350, and estimated that the cell tops in question were at approximately 
FL200, 80-100 nautical miles distant. Despite the distance of the cells from the aircraft, he 
confidently asserted that the cells topped out well below the aircraft altitude. 
ID:16  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Observed isolated cells over New Mexico and the Texas panhandle. Both pilots had flown ship 
3708 previously, and saw the system as a very significant improvement vs. the previous radar. 
Despite coming within 25 nautical miles of the storms, no magenta was depicted within these 
cells. 
ID:17  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Leg 1: PHX-CVG 
Context: Lots of rain with embedded convection ahead of a cold front pushing through the Ohio 
Valley throughout the day. Indianapolis Center had descended every CVG arrival from the west 
very early due to airspace restrictions associated with the weather. TARNE3 arrival to runway 
18R, solid IMC all the way to about 800 feet. 
Multiscan Performance: Excellent 
E-Turb Performance: Patch of speckled magenta encountered at FL290 within an area of 
relatively low reflectivity (green), and all felt that the correlation between the turbulence 
predicted by the magenta and the turbulence actually experienced was very good. At first, the 
captain commented that perhaps this area had been a false warning, since the magenta began to 
disappear behind us while the ride remained smooth. Before he could finish this sentence, the 
bumps occurred. 
Also had good correlation between a patch of speckled magenta encountered just after leveling at 
FL230, and skirted the right side of an area of concentrated speckles to the east and north of 
TARNE intersection. 
Similar turbulence encountered in areas where speckles were very sparsely distributed (from 
about 10,000 to 5000 feet, and particularly around 9,000 feet). This may have merely been 
turbulence just below the threshold established for the speckled magenta, but such experiences 
can be confusing and may underscore the need for significant education on the system once it is 
deployed more widely. 
Leg 2: CVG-LGA 
Relatively smooth with just a few speckles of magenta depicted during the climbout. Otherwise 
smooth, and no significant weather to LGA. 
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ID:18  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Context: After a modified holding pattern at Henderson VORTAC (HNN) due to a line of storms 
over the CVG airport, vectored to the north, then west, then south for a landing on 18L. Storms 
containing the highest reflectivity had largely moved south and east before being cleared from 
HNN, but lots of rain and turbulence still remained for the arrival. 
Multiscan Performance: Excellent 
E-Turb Performance: From 11,400 feet until about 9,000 feet, an area of predicted turbulence 
(concentrated speckles) within relatively low reflectivity correlated very well against what was 
experienced. Initially, the low reflectivity (green and nil returns) made both pilots skeptical about 
the existence of the turbulence, but after transiting the area, they agreed that the magenta had in 
fact told the truth. 
For the remainder of the descent, sparsely distributed speckles appeared within areas of relatively 
higher reflectivity (yellows), and the turbulence was fairly smooth. 
ID:19  Source: Pilot Feedback 
MDT TURB ENCOUNTERED DP RTG ATL THRU 9000. NO MAGENTA DSPLY. 
ENROUTE FL310 MDT CHP NO DSPLY SEVRL RANGES. 
ID:20  Source: Pilot Feedback 
1. Were you satisfied with the presentation/design of the 2 levels of magenta (if applicable)? 
– Yes 
i. If not, what did you see as deficient (e.g. definition around the 2 levels etc.)? 
Only dispersed pattern displayed 
2. Did the aircraft penetrate any area(s) where magenta was indicated? Yes! 
i. If so, did you feel that the magenta accurately predicted the level of turbulence 
experienced (if any)? Turb was present and approached moderate 
3. Was the 25 nm range of the magenta adequate for avoidance and/or the crew’s ability to 
secure the cabin? More notice would be better. By the time we were able to 
coordinate, we were in it. 
4. Did you encounter turbulence within clouds in areas where no magenta was depicted? 
N/A 
i. If so, would you have liked to see that turbulence depicted or was it too light to 
be worthwhile? 
Please feel free to include any other feedback in the space below. 
Great to have had the little warning we did! 
ID:21  Source: Pilot Feedback 
Context: Ideal proving ground for E-Turb, with lots of convection throughout south Georgia 
along the route of flight. Several TAPS reports (included below with rms g levels highlighted) 
were made during climbout and cruise. 
MESSAGE FROM DISPATCHER (prior to departure): 
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** PLEASE ACK ** 
WHEN ABLE PLEASE SEND FEEDBACK ON PERFORMANCE OF NEW RADAR, 
PARTICULARLY PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF MAGENTA WITH WX/T MODE SELECTED 
CREW FEEDBACK: 
A80 
FI DL1555/AN N378DA 
GOT GOOD WORKOUT WITH NEW RADAR. MAGENTA TBC WORKED GREAT EVEN 
AT HI ALT WITH MIN MOISTURE 
ID:22  Source: Pilot Feedback 
FROM RZC [waypoint in northwest Arkansas] TO PER [waypoint in north central Oklahoma], 
IN AND OUT OF CIRRUS WITH INTER LT CHOP. E TURB RADAR NOT PAINTING 
ANYTHING 
ID:23  Source: Pilot Feedback 
Descending into SLC, in the vicinity of convection, the aircraft sent a string of TAPS reports, 
including one moderate report. 
After landing, the captain commented that he was very pleased with the E-Turb system’s 
performance, which he said painted only speckled magenta. In his opinion, that correlated very 
well with what he experienced as turbulence “approaching moderate.” 
Additionally, he noted that the radar issued windshear alerts during taxi-in, and the tower 
confirmed the presence of microbursts south of the field. 
ID:24  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Lots of convective activity associated with frontal system over the US mid-section. 
East of Memphis, while level at FL380, passed between 2 cells in clear air. Speckled magenta 
overlaid red reflectivity in cell to the right (north of route). No turbulence encountered. 
NOTE: While in Memphis Center’s airspace, numerous aircraft asked if it would be possible to 
cut out some waypoints along their flight plan routes, since the weather system presented 
numerous options for tactical deviations. The response from ATC was, “There are weather routes 
from the Northeast into the West and Southwest, and we have been told to grant no shortcuts 
without first calling traffic management.” 
Near the Oklahoma panhandle/Colorado/Kansas borders, while level at FL360, heading 290 in 
cirrus cloud, a speck of magenta ahead and to the left of the flight path, associated with a small 
circle of green reflectivity, appeared. The captain turned on the seatbelt sign. 
The magenta then disappeared, and the area of reflectivity also began to dissipate. Moments later, 
the aircraft emerged from the cirrus, revealing a small buildup that topped out just below the 
altitude of the aircraft. No turbulence encountered. 
ID:25  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Continued convective activity associated with frontal system over US mid-section. 
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During taxi-out, ground control advised the crew to call clearance delivery for a re-route to the 
filed flight plan. Clearance confirmed that the re-route was due to weather over the mid-section of 
the US, and issued a drastic re-route to the north. Instead of a more or less linear due east routing 
to Newark (in accordance with the original flight plan), the re-route drew an arc whose top was at 
the upper peninsula of Michigan, adding 200 nm to the journey and resulting in an arrival that 
was 30 minutes late despite an on-time departure. Arrival time would have been later had the 
captain been less conscientious about looking for the best winds and asking for shortcuts. 
Despite the radar’s 320 nm range, weather was painted only once. The cells captured were 150-
200 nm distant, had lots of space between them, and were just to the north of Detroit. 
ID:26  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Lots of convection throughout the eastern U.S. associated with a low pressure system that had 
come ashore the prior weekend as Hurricane Cindy. All descriptions assume AUTO mode with 
the gain set to calibrate. 
Climbing away from Atlanta at about 4500’, ATC issued a vector due to weather over JCKTS 
intersection. This weather was depicted on the radar screen in green and yellow, and despite 
being within about 15 nm of the cell, there was no magenta associated with it. Due to weather 
west and southwest of MEI (Meridian, MS), numerous deviations were made enroute. 
During descent at FL250 in IMC conditions, a few specks of magenta associated with a small 
patch of green reflectivity appeared ahead. Though the ride was relatively smooth in surrounding 
areas, only very light chop was encountered while transiting this area. 
Later, while descending at FL180 and again in IMC, more specks of magenta, associated with 
black returns, appeared in the flight path. As the aircraft approached the area where the specks 
had been apparent, however, magenta disappeared. 
Lots of reflectivity with speckled and solid magenta appeared to the right of course during the 
remainder of the descent into MSY. Due to a late descent from ATC, however, a left hand 360-
degree turn was made. Magenta was not apparent in any cells during the turn, but reappeared a 
few seconds after rolling out and resuming the arrival towards runway 19. No areas of magenta or 
reflectivity were penetrated for remainder of the flight. 
ID:27  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Upon contacting departure immediately after takeoff from runway 19, ATC issued a right hand 
vector to 320 degrees. Reflectivity there was green and yellow, though nil to the left. The captain 
requested a left hand turn to the same heading instead, and the controller denied the request citing 
traffic to the east and reports of a smooth ride from two Southwest B737s that had departed 
through the area of weather just before. In addition, no magenta was depicted in that area, and as 
advertised, a smooth ride was experienced. 
Because of widespread thunderstorms across Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia, an ATC reroute 
prior to takeoff had put the flight on an enroute heading of due north towards Memphis before a 
right turn towards the ERLIN2 arrival into ATL. Heading 010 towards Memphis, weather was 
depicted at fairly long range in a northeasterly line from Jackson to Columbus, MS. The captain 
requested to cut the corner towards ERLIN in order to take advantage of a large hole north of the 
line, but was denied due to “in-trail flow restrictions” from the Traffic Management Unit. In the 
first officer’s estimation, this routing added about 250 nm to the flight, and the FMS calculated an 
additional 30 minutes to Atlanta. 
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All was rendered moot, however, when a lingering thunderstorm over the Atlanta airport and 
holding at 2 locations progressively closer to the arrival necessitated a 2.5-hour diversion to 
Hunstville, AL. 
Continuing from HSV to ATL, no significant weather close to the flight path was encountered. 
The top of a small cumulus buildup with no reflectivity and no magenta, however, was 
encountered in VMC during cruise at FL190. The captain nonetheless elected to deviate around 
the cloud with a quick left turn before returning to the flight plan route, and asked why he had not 
seen any magenta. I responded that the turbulence in the cloud probably amounted only to light 
chop that was below the magenta trigger, but couldn’t be sure since we didn’t actually go through 
the cloud. 
ID:28  Source: Jump Seat Observation 
Lots of convection south of the TN/GA line, associated with a stationary front draped across the 
southeast. While deviating left of a cell over Atlanta, windshear was forcing the temporary 
closure of the Atlanta airport. Thunderstorms extended through south Georgia into the Florida 
panhandle around Tallahassee, then quieted before picking up again along the west coast of the 
peninsula. The captain, who remarked that he was relatively new on the 737-800, was the pilot 
flying. 
First cells encountered were east of Chattanooga, TN, extending south over Atlanta while at 
FL370. Green and yellow returns were observed with the radar in AUTO mode, and the captain 
deviated well left and clear. In marginal IMC conditions between Chattanooga and Atlanta, 
however, no magenta was observed while flying through an area of nil reflectivity, and the ride 
was in fact smooth. 
Several more cells, showing lots of red, dotted the route south of Atlanta towards Tallahassee. 
The captain chose a narrow passage that avoided all reflectivity. South of Columbus, GA, the 
captain took the radar out of AUTO mode, demonstrating how he would normally use the 
conventional radar. Leaving the gain at the calibrated position and tilting at 0 and -1 degrees, 
reflectivity was, of course, significantly reduced, and he felt that he was getting more reflectivity 
in AUTO mode than was actually present. I then explained the automatic gain compensation, and 
after pointing out the cells as they appeared through the windows, both crewmembers somewhat 
grudgingly agreed that the picture painted by AUTO mode had indeed told the truth. 
While green returns in AUTO mode mostly represented the edge of storms, prompting deviation, 
only black had been present in the same areas while in manual mode. From the standpoint of an 
effort to validate the magenta by getting into some IMC conditions, the reluctance to penetrate 
any reflectivity was frustrating. I wished that, in good conscience, I could have dialed down the 
gain while in AUTO mode to achieve better validation. Still, we did get well within 25 nautical 
miles of many cells showing heavy reflectivity, and, interestingly, very little magenta was 
observed in and around these areas. One might speculate that these storms were diminishing due 
to the onset of nightfall. 
During the descent towards Tampa, a more or less continuous line of cells was observed left of 
course. While level at FL240, magenta speckles appeared in green reflectivity but left of course, 
15 nm distant. Magenta was observed ahead, again left of course, descending through 15,000 feet. 
For no apparent reason, the captain took the gain out of AUTO mode at 8000 feet, despite no cells 
and VMC conditions prevailing for the remainder of the flight. After the approach was briefed, I 
asked to put the radar back in AUTO mode at about 6000 feet. The captain replied, “For now.” 
Once on the ground, I asked the captain why he had taken the radar out of AUTO mode, and he 
explained that due to the high workload, his newness on the 737-800, and the presence of 
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thunderstorms in the vicinity, his behavior almost subconsciously defaulted to the familiar. I told 
him I understood, but also explained – as humbly as possible – that by eliminating workload to 
help the crew focus on flying the airplane, that’s exactly the environment in which the automation 
shines. 
Though the Multiscan picture definitely appears more accurate than the one painted by previous 
generation systems, as pilots currently conceive using the weather radar in the en route 
environment, it is scaring crews to deviate much wider from storms than they might otherwise. 
Meanwhile, in the terminal area, where reflectivity for the same gain setting on older systems is 
naturally much higher, crews are used to seeing a lot of red on the radar screen. During this flight 
in fact, the first officer remarked that he often sees a lot of red during the approach phase of 
flight, only to discover heavy rain and a fairly smooth ride. So due to the wide disparities in the 
picture given by a constant gain setting on legacy systems, areas of high reflectivity at low levels 
appear to be of much lesser concern than red returns at altitude. 
With training and experience with newer radar systems, perceptions and methodologies about 
reflectivity and hazard are likely to change, but getting to that point will be a challenge for those 
used to older systems. 
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